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If I should learn, in scame quite casual way,
That you were gone, not to return again
—
Read from the back-page of a paper, say.
Held by a nei^ibor in a subway train.
Hew at the comer of this avenue
And such a street (so are the papers filled)
A hurrying man, v^o happened to be you.
At noon today had happ^ied to be killed
I should not cry aloud—I could not cry
Aloud, or wring ray hands in such a place
—
I should but watch the station lights rush by
With a more careful interest on ray face;
Or raise ray eyes and read with greater care
Where to store furs and how to treat the hair.
Edna St. Vincent Millay,
1917
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCnON
Few events interrupt our lives with as mich dramatic intensity
and emotional upheaval as the death of a loved person. There are
several iitimediately discernible reasons for this. First, the process
of bereavement often unleashes a barrage of strong emotions-
depression, desolation, loneliness, fear, anger, bitterness, guilt,
and despair among them—which, in their potency and pervasive
influence, may be unlike any emotions the bereaved person has
previously experienced. Second, the death often dictates very real
changes in the person's life. It may result in the severing of old
patterns and behaviors, the forced adoption of new skills or
responsibilities, the rearrangement of family structure, or
alterations in financial status. And third, particularly if it is
unejqDected or if the deceased is a young person, v^ose death seems
out of keeping with the "natural" order of things, the death may call
into question some of the most basic beliefs and assuitptions that
guide the bereaved person's life. These may include deeply (and
often tacitly) held beliefs about religion, fate, the benevolence of
the world, the safety of the world, the meaning or purpose of life,
and the degree to v^iich one is in control of one's own destiny.
There is little disagreement with the notion that bereavement
can cause profound changes in a person's life. The psychological
literature of the past 25 years pertaining to grief has attempted to
describe (e.g. Click, Weiss & Parkes, 1974; Parkes, 1986) as well as
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operationalize (Sanders, Mauger, & Strong, 1979; W. Stroebe &
Stroebe, 1987; Zisook, Devaul, & Click, 1982) the grieving process.
A wealth of studies have focussed on the effects of bereavement on
mortality and health (cf
.
M. Stroebe, Stroebe, Gergen & Gergen, 1981;
W. Stroebe & Stroebe, 1987) . Also found in the literature are
attempts to delineate "normal" grief from "pathological" grief, to
distinguish the effects of a sudden death from those of an illness
(e.g. Ball, 1977; Click et al, 1974; Lundin, 1984; Sanders, 1982-
1983)
,
to establish a suitable timeline for a grieving process, and
to identify stages or milestones in the passage from acute grief to
recovery (e.g. Kubler-Ross, 1969; Spiegel, 1977; Zisook & Devaul,
1985)
.
However, amid this plethora of studies examining bereavement's
effects on behavior, emotion, psychological state, and health, what
is missing is a systematic exploration of the effects of bereavement
on an individual's network of beliefs and assumptions about life.
These changes in attitude appear to be axiomatically accepted in the
descriptions of more overt indications of change, but rarely become
the object of scrutiny in themselves.
For example, in the Harvard Bereavement Project (Click, Weiss, &
Parkes, 1974) , a general goal of the study was "to describe in a
systematic way the experience of grieving and the processes by v\tiich
individuals recover from grief" (p. 3) . Yet even in this
conprehensive landmark investigation, there was no attenpt to
e^qjlore, and minimal data regarding, vytiat had changed in the
subjects' assunptions about life.
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The present study is an exploration of the "assumptive worlds"
of bereaved irdividuals. The study was undertaken for several
reasons. First, as this is largely uncharted territory, the findings
my be of benefit in helping to fontiulate more ejqjansive notions of
vAiat grief is and how pervasive its effects are, particularly in the
realm of cognitive changes. Second, an understanding of how one's
assumptive world changes due to bereavement can be related to vhat is
already established regarding the effects of other traumas and major
life events on assunptive beliefs. For example, there is support for
the hypothesis that the experience of a negative trauma alters the
victim's belief system (Janoff-Bulman, 1985; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze,
1983)
.
Bereavement, in this regard, may be considered one of a
subset of events that call into question fundamental beliefs. Third,
it may be that detecting differences in the belief systems of
bereaved individuals—and the changes that the bereavement has
wrouc^t i:^n the belief systems—can help e5q)lain some unclarified
issues about grief, such as v^y some individuals grieve
"pathologically" and others grieve "normally," or vhy grief may be
short-lived for some individuals and protracted for others. (As an
example, it may be that individuals v^o believe that people "get what
they deserve" in life will ej^jerience more difficulty in reconciling
the death of a loved one than do individuals vho believe in the
caprice of fate.) And fourth, assuming that insist is at least one
tool in facilitating change, an understanding of how bereavement has
affected one's assunptive world may have therapeutic ramifications.
3
providing a different template for understanding some of the
conflict, pain and confusion that are part of grief.
4
CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF GRIEF: AN OVERVIEW
Primarily for the ideas detailed in 'Tyiouming and Melancholia,"
Siginund Freud (1917) is credited with the first psychologically-based
systematic theory of grief. Freud thought that grieving was the
process by v*iich the energy vdiich connected the lost object to the
bereaved person was gradually withdrawn, or decathected. Freud
labelled the process "hypercathexis." To accornplish the process,
bereaved individuals turn their back on the world and undergo an
emotional review of the person's life. Grief is successfully worked
through v^en the individual has decathected the energy from the
deceased person and hence can return to society and establish new
bonds with people.
John Bowlby's (1961) ideas about grief are grounded in
psychoanalytic thought but also were strongly influenced by the
fields of ethology, neurophysiology, and information theory, as well
as his observations of separation and loss in childhood. Bowlby's
theory is based on the inportance of attachment for survival in
infants and young animals. He posits that the process of grieving is
similar to earlier ej^riences with loss and consists of three
stages: protest, despair and detachment. The protest stage consists
of behaviors that are designed (Bowlby suggests they are triggered
biochemically) to bring back the lost object. These behaviors
include crying and anger—both of vydiich an infant learns as effective
behaviors in retrieving the desired mother. The despair stage.
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during v^ich the infant (or bereaved individual) realizes that
protest has been ineffectual in bringing back the desired object, is
characterized by pain and the disorganization of one's set of
expectations and assuiiptions about the environment. Although it is
disorganizing, it is reality-based (in the case of bereavement)
, for
it is a process of adjustment to the irrevocability of the loss. The
final stage, detachment, signals an acceptance of the loss and the
resolution of grief.
Bowlby (1969) believes that an integral part of human perception
and cognition is a "working model of the world," v^iich serves to make
sense of the world. The model is active and is constantly subjected
to modification based on experience. The despair stage of grieving
can be thought of as the resulting inadequacy of the individual's
working model to help him or her explain the permanence of the loss.
In the view of Parkes (1971, 1988)
,
grief is the gradual process
of internal reification of an event that has already happened in
external reality. These modifications of the internal world take
time. The pain and frustration of grief is caused, at least in part,
by the discrepancies between the external world and internal
representations which have not yet changed accordingly. Parkes
(1988) suggests that bereavement is one of a class of events, which
he labels "psychosocial transitions," that cause upheaval in one's
life and one's assumptive world. These are major life transitions
v^ich "require people to undertake a major revision of their
assuroptions about the world; are lasting in their implications rather
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than transient; and take place cfver a relatively short pericxi of time
so that there is little opportunity for preparation" (p. 55)
.
Parkes does not feel, however, that psychosocial transitions
alone can accoiont for the existence and intensity of grief. He
believes that Bowlby's attachinent theory is also a key element in
grieving, although he has not specified the relationship or
interaction between his ideas and those of Bowlby.
Approaching grief from a different perspective, Wortman and
Silver (1987; in press) argue that many of the central tenets of
widely accepted theories of grief lack empirical validity.
Specifically, they suggest that five key assumptions of dealing with
a loss are not substantiated by the data. These assuirptions are: 1)
distress or depression is an inevitable consequence of loss; 2)
failure to ej^)erience distress is indicative of pathology; 3) a loss
must be "worked through" in order to come to a successful resolution;
4) there is an expectation of "recovery" from the loss; and 5) this
recovery is understood as reaching a state of resolution regarding
the loss.l
In their review of the literature on bereavement and sudden
physical disability, Wortman and Silver suggest that these "myths of
In the earlier (1987) presentation of their argument, Wortman
and Silver included two additional assuirptions they found
unwarranted: 1) positive emotions are absent in grief; and 2) it is
necessary to break down attachments to the lost object as part of
dealing with the loss. Their challenge to these assuitptions is
bolsetered by enpirical support, i.e. a lack of eirpirical
substantiation for the assuirptions. However, these two points are
neither addressed nor incorporated into the more recent presentation
of their argument.
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coping" do not adequately match the reality of personal ejqjerience.
They argue that although these assumptions are unwarranted, they are
deeply ingrained in cultural stereotypes and in the theoretical
biases of researchers and mental health providers. The perpetuation
of these myths does a disservice to bereaved individuals, in that
they provide an inadequate or incanplete template for understanding
grief. In addition, by focusing on the notion of a "correct" path to
complete resolution, attention is diverted from other potentially
iitportant aspects of loss: "In our judgment, an unfortunate
consequence of the pervasive belief in recovery from loss is that
attention has been deflected away from examining the possible
mechanisms through which loss may produce subsequent and continued
mental or physical health problems" (in press; p. 20)
.
The authors suggest that a more empirically and clinically valid
approach to understanding grief involves acknowledging the
possibility of three potential grieving styles: individuals v^o move
from hi^ to low distress over time (i.e., the traditional, expected
pattern) ; individuals who do not show distress, either in immediate
reaction to the loss or subsequently; and individuals \A\o remain in a
hi^ state of distress for a longer period of time than current
theories of grief label appropriate.
In their conclusion, Wortman and Silver tacitly acknowledge that
they allow for the possibility of pathological grieving. However,
they do not discuss in their proposed model how a pathological
response would be identified given the various styles discussed.
While this remains an unresolved and awkward result of their central
8
thesis, their argument is nonetheless valid and important in calling
into question some of the most influential assumptions that guide the
understanding of bereavement in our culture.
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CHAPTER III
A FEW PARAMETERS OF GRIEF: A REVIEW OF THE UTERATORE
There are four relevant aspects of grief vdiich, vAiile not all
directly related to the present study, are discussed because together
they begin to fom an integrated fabric of what is entailed in
bereavement. These four topics are: the length of grief, normal vs.
pathological grief, how grief is affected by the type of death, and
the role of social support in facilitating successful resolution of
grief.
Length of Grief
There is no agreement among various authors about vdiat
constitutes the proper period for normal grief. Conservative
estimates cillow four to six weeks for normal grieving (Linderaann,
1944) ; however, recent findings (e.g. Lehman, Wortman, & Williams,
1987; lundin, 1984; Zisook, DeVaul, & Click, Jr., 1982), suggest that
grief mi^t be a much longer, and perhaps indefinitely long, process.
Lindemann (1944) interviewed 101 survivors of the Coconut Grove
fire in Boston. His findings are regarded as an iitportant
description of "acute" grief, accounting for both the emotional and
somatic reactions typical of recent bereavement. After four to six
weeks, Lindemann found, these pronounced syirptoms were in abeyance,
leading him to conclude that grief was a relatively brief
psychological event.
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In contrast, Lehman, Wortman and Williams (1987) interviewed 80
subjects v^ose spouse or child had died suddenly in a car accident
four to seven years previously. The bereaved spouses and parents
were significantly more depressed than matched controls (as measured
by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist) ; the bereaved spouses also measured
significantly lower on measures of social functioning, psychological
well-being, reactivity to good events, and future worries and
concerns. Further, the majority of the bereaved (68% of spouses, 59%
of parents) reported that they had never made any sense of the death
or found any meaning in it. Of the many respondents (85% of spouses
and 91% of parents) v^o had asked themselves "Why me?" or "Why (ray
spouse/child)?," the majority (59% of each category) had not been
able to find an answer.
Both Lundin (1984) and Zisook, DeVaul and Click, Jr. (1982) used
the Texas Grief Inventory (Faschingbauer, DeVaul, & Zisook, 1977;
Zisook, et al., 1982) to measure the extent to v*iich a bereaved
person was still grieving for a person viho had died several years
before. Lundin corpared 130 first-degree relatives of individuals
v*io had died suddenly with first-degree relatives of individuals
vdiose death had been expected. The subjects and controls had both
been bereaved eight years previously. Lundin found significantly
higher levels of grief among the sudden death group than among the
expected death controls. The study, however, does not include any
measures of functioning or psychological state to correlate with the
Texas Grief Inventory. As there are no normative data for the Texas
Grief Inventory, it is difficult to make statements about the degree
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of grief after ei^t years, other than comparisons between the two
groups.
Zisook, et al. (1982) administered the Texas Grief Inventory to
211 subjects who had been bereaved from between one month and 12
years prior to the time of the study. They found that the acute
dysphoria of grief peaked within one to two years after bereavement,
but that even after 10 years, several items of the inventory were
still strongly endorsed (e.g. "At times I still feel the need to cry
for the person v^o died," or "Even now it's painful to recall
memories of the person v*io died")
.
In short, the primary trend in the literature has been a
lengthening of the time thou^t to be appropriate for "normal" grief.
This pattern is represented in the difference between Lindemann's
1944 assessment and the current tendency towards viewing grief as a
more open- ended process. While the more dramatic and dysphoric
syirptoms of grief may reach their peak in the first two years, the
residual effects may have a very long-term influence on the bereaved
person.
Related to this, there has been a growing wariness of stage
models of grief (e.g. that of Kubler-Ross, 1969). Zisook, et al.
(1982) found that grief can be manifested in an array of behaviors
and emotions. Parkes (1986) states: "Grief is not a set of syitptoms
v^ich start after a loss and then gradually fade away. It involves a
succession of clinical pictures v*iich blend into and replace one
another" (p. 27). In addition, the pattern of grieving is influenced
by factors such as sudden vs. expected death, the age of the
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deceased, and most likely a host of other cultural and personal
variables (e.g. Click, et al., 1974; Sanders, 1982-83). What is
emerging is a construct of grief v*iich is complex, imilti-dimensional,
and, at least to some degree, idiosyncratic.
Pathological vs. Non-mtholoaical Grief
Given the above-mentioned inability to delineate v*iat
constitutes a normal grieving process, both in terms of length and in
how it is manifested, it is not surprising that drawing a line
between pathological and non-pathological grief is difficult to do.
Zisook and DeVaul (1985) state:
. . .our studies have suggested that unresolved grief is a
somevAiat overly siirplistic concept. Most, if not all, people
never totally resolve their grief; significant aspects of the
bereavement process go on for years after the loss, even in
otherwise normal patients.
. .It is unclear at v*iat point and to
vAiat degree these behaviors and symptoms become medical or
psychiatric concerns and become pathological or predispose to
serious medical, psychological, or social conplications (p. 377).
This is in contrast to Parkes and Weiss (1983)
,
v^o, in a long-
term follow \jp to the Harvard Bereavement Study (Glick, et al., 1974)
identify three patterns of chronic grief in widows: unexpected-grief
syndrome, ambivalent-grief syndrome, and chronic-grief syndrome. The
first syndrome results from an unexpected death; the other two result
from interpersonal dynamics in the relationship with the deceased
spouse (ambivalent grief from an ambivalent relationship, and chronic
grief from a relationship in vdiich one member, either the survivor or
the deceased, was strongly dependent i^n the other)
.
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Cowan and Murphy (1985) , while avoiding the concept of
pathological vs. non-pathological grief, attempted to isolate
variables that influenced a positive outcome of bereavement.
Subjects were 69 individuals who had been bereaved as a result of the
Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption in 1980. Fifty matched non-bereaved
individuals served as a control group, ihe variables studied were
gender, age, concurrent life stress, social support, self-reported
centrality or peripherality of the deceased to the bereaved person,
and perception of the death as preventable or unpreventable. Outcome
measures were depression, somatization and physical health status (as
measured by the Hopkins Symptom Checklist and a six-item physical
health index)
.
The six selected variables, v^en analyzed with a
hierarchical step-wise regression, accounted for 48% of the variance
in predicting depression, 39% in predicting somatization and 35% in
predicting physical health status. Concurrent life stress (as
measured by the Life ED^jeriences Survey) was the most significant
predictor for all three outcomes.
Effects of Type of Death
The majority of studies contrasting the effects of long-term vs.
sudden death suggest that sudden death has both longer lasting and
immediately more deleterious effects (e.g. Ball, 1977; Click, et al.,
1974; Dundin, 1984; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; W. Stroebe & Stroebe,
1987)
.
As one exception, Sanders (1982-83) looked at 86 bereaved
individuals shortly after bereavement and at an 18 month follow-up.
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She divided her subjects into three groi^: sudden death, short-term
chronic illness (defined as less than six months) , and long-term
chronic illness. Using the Grief Experience Inventory (Sanders,
Mauger & Strong, 1979) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Pfersonality
Inventory, she did not find group differences in the overall number
of symptoms or extent of grief reported, but did find differences in
the types of symptoms reported. At the 18 month follow-up, the
sudden death groi^ showed greater anger, guilt, depersonalization,
somatization and physical synptoms than the other groups; the long-
term chronic group showed the most social isolation, rumination,
denial and loss of emotional control.
Sanders' study hints at v*iat are likely important variables to
consider in assessing the effects of various types of death. For
exairple, in a long-term illness a spouse may spend a great deal of
his or her time in the role of caretaker. Once the person dies, the
survivor may be deprived not only of his or her mate, but also of
v*iat had become the primary role that gave meaning to his or her
life.
Lindemann (1944) first suggested the relative benefit of
"anticipatory grief" in predisposing bereaved individuals to a
positive outcome. Click et al. (1974) concur that advanced warning
of death predisposes the mourner towarxJs a less-troubled resolution
of grief; however, they pointedly reject the notion of anticipatory
grief. From the results of their extensive interviews with 49 widows
and 19 widowers, they conclude:
...the iiipact on survivors of a long-forewarned death is quite
different from the impact of a totally uneoqsected death. The
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ijy in v^iich they differ is not that anticipation has permittedthe eventual survivor to begin to reorganize himself or herselfboth cognitively and emotionally so that the loss, when it
comes, is already partially grieved for. If this were the case
anticipated grief and unanticipated grief would follow the same'
course, thou<^ anticipated grief would begin it earlier. Thisis not v*iat happens. The grief that follows unanticipated
bereavement is different in both form and duration from the
grief that has been anticipated (p. 14; underlining original
authors')
.
There are several complications in fully interpreting the
literature on "no-warning" vs. "advance-warning" bereavement. First,
few studies control, a priori, for age of the deceased person, age of
the bereaved person, and the relationship between the deceased and
the bereaved. Second, it is unclear that a bi-polar structure is
most appropriate. Most studies (e.g. Click et al, 1974; Lundin,
1984) define sudden death as no advance warning, thereby categorizing
a few days' warning (or, in Lundin's case, a few hours' warning) with
illnesses of lengthy duration. Sanders' study, with its tri-partite
structure, appears to be a more sensible structural categorization of
periods of warning.
Role of Social Support in Bereavement
There are anple data showing that social support can be an
important factor in enabling a person to recover from a traumatic
incident. For exaitple, Pennebaker and O'Heeron (1984) found that
spouses of suicide and accident victims v4io confided in others and
talked about the trauma reported a significantly lower illness rate
than those v*io did not talk about it. Pennebaker (e.g., 1987)
hypothesizes that the there is an inhibition-disease connection,
vAiereby "the act of inhibiting or otherwise restraining ongoing
16
behavior, thoughts and feelings requires physiological work" (p.781)
.
The assumption with bereavement is that not talking about the
emotions and thoughts connected with the death represents inhibition.
As previously discussed, Cowan and Murphy (1985) use perceived
social support as one of six predictor variables in determining the
psychological and somatic correlates of grieving. Their results
indicate that it is significantly correlated with depression, but not
with somatization or general health concerns.
Lehman, Ellard and Wortman (1986) attempted to operationalize
social support for bereaved individuals by separating it into
constituent components (e.g., "contact with similar others," "provide
opportunity to discuss feelings," and "give advice") . Using the same
subjects discussed in the Lehman, Wortman and Williams (1987) long-
term bereavement study, they asked subjects to list, retrospectively,
v4iat had been helpful and unhelpful to them in terms of social
support. Subjects could endorse as many items as they wished. The
types of social support that were perceived as most helpful were
having contact with a similar other, the opportunity to ventilate,
and eoqDressions of concern. The types of support that were perceived
as most unhelpful were v*ien people encouraged recovery, gave advice,
or made rude remarks or acted rudely.
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CHAPIER IV
ASSUMPTIVE WORID BELIEFS: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
As With Bcfwlby's (1969) previously discussed notion that
individuals fomulate a "working model of the world" to make sense of
both internal and external data, several theorists have postulated
the existence of an "assumptive world" that guides thoughts,
behaviors and emotions. Common to these theories is the
conceptualization of the assumptive world as an active filter,
allowing for varying interpretations of the same objective phenomena
so that they are most concordant with the internal belief system. In
most cases, the assumptions are thought to be operating at a level
outside of or beyond the individual's awareness. Four theorists will
be discussed: George Kelly, Melvin Lemer, Seymour Epstein and
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman.
Georrre Kelly
According to personal construct theory (1955) , individuals
conduct their lives much like scientists conduct experiments: both
engage in a constant testing of hypotheses. The scientist tests
hypotheses to confirm or negate a theoretical model, and individuals
test hypotheses to maintain or alter their conceptions of, and
expectations about, reality. Events in the objective world are
construed in such a way as to make the most sense with pre-existing
assumptions. According to this approach, v^ich was of seminal
importance in the development of cognitive-based schools
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of psychotherapy, "a person's processes are psychologically
channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events" (1963, p.io)
.
Kelly posits three stages to the process of approaching the cJata
of day to day living: circumspection, preemption and choice.
Information is interpreted to be congruent with a larger model, or
set of assumptions, the individual has about him / herself and the
world. This internal model (or theory) is pervasive in its
influence:
a theory, then—scientific or personal—ou^t to cover a lot of
situations, to be fertile with coherent practical suggestions
about v*iat one might do in those situations, to be a reasonable
approximation to the truth—serving the person at his present
stage of development, and it should always lead to constructive
ejqjerimentation and revision (1963, p. 24).
For Kelly, change is brou(^t about by transferring the
assumptive bases by vdiich an individual construes reality to the
conscious inspection and direction of the individual.
Melvin Lemer
According to Lemer's (1980) "just world" hypothesis, people
operate on an assumptive (and moral) level as if there were a causal
connection between peoples' character and vdiat happens to them in
life; in other words, people get v^t they deserve. There is a need
to explain events in terms that are the most sensible, or most
consistent with a simple cause and effect model; hence, if you are a
"good" person, good things will happen to you, and if you are a "bad"
person, then bad things will happen to you. Because of the causal
relationship posited between character and action, the belief in a
just world is a powerful tool in "blaming the victim" for an act that
19
mi<^t otherwise be viewed as random. For example, people might
believe that a woman v^o is raped is "scanehow asking for it," or a
person with AIDS "somehow deserves" to be so afflic±ed.
The just world hypothesis implies that in the case of an
unej^jected or untimely death of a loved one, a bereaved person will
face an "assumptive dilemma." In other words, if an individual
tacitly believes in a just world, he or she will then have to
relinquish that belief, or struggle to maintain it in the face of
disconfirming evidence.
Seymour Epstein
Epstein (1980) postulates an assunptive world in which the
iirportance of the self-concept is introduced as one of the
significant sets of assumptions that enable an individual to construe
reality. Each individual creates a personal theory of reality,
guiding not only how he or she behaves, but also how he or she thinks
and feels. The individual theory "determines how a person
selectively attends to experience, encodes it into schemas, and
files, organizes and selectively retrieves the schemas in a manner
that facilitates coping with reality" (1986, p.l).
There are three main goals of the personal reality theory: "to
maintain a favorable pleasure-pain balance over the anticipated
future, to assimilate the data of reality into a cohesive, relatively
stable conceptual system, and to maintain a favorable level of self-
esteem. Behavior is normally a conpromise between these three
functions" (1986, p. 1-2) . A crucial point is that these three goals
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are interrelated and an effect on one will necessitate changes in the
others. Thus, events which jar one's assumptions about reality, such
as bereavement, may also impinge on one's self
-worth.
Epstein posits that, related to the three goals of personal
reality theory, individuals have two primary systems for self-
knowledge: an experiential conceptual system and a rational
conceptual system. The two are related, but Epstein stresses their
independence more than their commonality; thus, it is possible to
know something on a rational level (e.g., that airplane travel is
statistically safer than automobile travel) but believe otherwise on
an experiential level (i.e., the same person mi^t fear riding in an
airplane but not in an automobile)
. Thus, Epstein believes that a
purely cognitive approach to facilitating change is incorrplete. The
experiential conceptual system—the "deeper" and more primtive of
the two—needs to be addressed emotionally and ejqjerientially rather
than cerebrally.
Epstein's theory suggests several important iiiplications for
bereavement. First, in the broadest sense, an unexpected death
(either because it is sudden or because it is "age-inappropriate")
will likely severely strain one's theory of reality, since it so
strongly affects tacit beliefs about the orderliness and sensibility
of life. Second, because the various goals of the personal reality
theory are inextricably intertwined, one would expect such a dramatic
change in assuirptions in reality to be reflected in an individual's
level of self-worth. Third, the hypothesized existence of two
independent conceptual systems lends itself to a theory of grief,
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simlar to the Barkes (1988) position already discussed. Grief might
be thought of as the gradual ej^iential learning of knowledge which
the rational system can inore quickly grasp, and the restructuring of
one's personal theory of reality v*iich is necessitated by the real
changes in the external world. (One implication here is that the
individual's assumptive world is lodged at a deep level, and hence to
disturb it requires ej^iential, rather than rational, learning)
.
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman
In order to e>q)lain the common responses of trauma victims
across a wide range of events (e.g. rape, incest, criminal assault,
natural disaster), Janoff-Bulman (1985; Janoff-Bulman & Frieze, 1983)
has hypothesized that the shared link in various posttraumatic stress
reactions is the need to reconstitute the basic, implicit assumptions
an individual holds about him or herself and the world which have
been shattered by the traumatic event.
Janoff-Bulman's (in press) model of the assumptive world
contains three categories of basic assumptions by vliich an individual
construes reality: the benevolence of the world, the meaningfulness
of the world, and the individual's self-worth or self-esteem. These
three categories of assunptions are subdivided and represented by
ei^t more specific systems of belief: the benevolence of the world
and of people; the belief in a just world; the belief that people, in
general, can have control over their world by engaging in the proper
behaviors; the belief that the world is "random"— i.e. that good and
bad events are distributed by chance; the belief that one is a good
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and worthy person; the belief that "I" (not people in general) can
control the outcome of life events by engaging in the proper
behaviors; and the belief that one is a lucky person.
These systems of beliefs can combine in many different ways.
For example, an individual might believe that the world is malicious
and random, but that he or she is a deserving and lucky person. Or,
a person might believe that the world is just, and that he or she is
not worthy and so deserves \4iatever he or she gets.
It can be seen that there are parallels between Janoff-Bulman's
three main categories of assumptions and Epstein's three goals of a
personal theory of reality (a positive pleasure-pain balance, a need
to form a cohesive picture of reality, and self-worth) . The models
differ in that in Janoff-Bulman's work, the enphasis is on the
specific content of the assunptions, and how the content of these
assuirptions are affected v^en an individual is faced with an
unexpected trauma.
Janoff-Bulman's "World Assunptions Scale" (in press) is designed
to assess the degree to vy^ich individuals subscribe to the various
beliefs described above. In a sanple of 338 college undergraduates,
83 reported that they had experienced one or more of the following
traumatic events: death of a parent, death of a sibling, incest,
rape, fire that destroyed their home, and an accident resulting in a
serious disability. Three of the assunptions significantly
distinguished the "victim" from the "non-victim" group: perceived
self-worth, chance as a distributional principle for making sense of
the world, and the benevolence of the world. The single best
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predictor of victimized status was lower self-^orth (Janoff-Bulman,
in press)
.
Synopsis
Several key points emerge from this brief review of the
assunptive world.
First, our assuitptions constitute a conoplex and multi-
dimensional network of beliefs, involving both a view of reality and
a view of the self, by which individuals make sense of the world
around them and their place in it.
Second, these assunptions usually operate at a level outside of
awareness, but nonetheless exert a great deal of influence over
decisions that are made and emotions and attitudes that are perceived
or felt. A dramatic change in one's environment, totally incongruent
with one's belief system, may force a conscious examination of the
assumptions; on the other hand, the belief system may instead be
resilient enough that it will remain unchanged, and hence dictate
changes in the perception of reality.
Third, the "perceiver" and the perceived are inextricably
united; in other words, one's beliefs about oneself are integrally
tied to one's beliefs about the world.
And fourth, an individual's assunptive world is extremely
resistant to change. It operates on a deep intrapsychic level and
may be inseparable from a core sense of self. (On a related note, it
is to this point that Edna St. Vincent Millay so eloquently speaks in
the sonnet v^ich introduces this paper. How much easier—and how
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fervent the desire-to ignore traumatic events vAiich disnipt our
lives, to sijtply "read with greater care where to store furs, and how
to treat the hair.")
It should be noted that v*iile many assumptions people hold may
be "wrong" or misguided at some fundamental level, they are crucial
in maintaining a sense of well-being and prtxiuctivity in life. A
belief in personal invulnerability, for instance, may be an illusory
but vital "false" assumption that enables an individual to cope, and
thrive, in v^t is, in actuality, a random and capricious world.
In The Denial of Death, Becker (1973) argues that all meaning
and productivity in life is derived from a false assumption, that of
immortality. It is a denial of death that drives humans to seek
meaning or accorrplishment in their pursuits. But in the context of a
deeper and inescapable reality this ascription of meaning is false, a
necessary but sham construction v^ich allows humans to function in
vihat would otherwise be an existential abyss.
25
CHAPIER V
RATIONAIE AND HYPOIHESES FOR THE PRESENT STUDY
Given the theoretical struc±ure of the assunptive world which
has been discussed, one expectation is that a traumatic event, such
as bereavement, will deeply affect an individual's underlying beliefs
about him or herself and the world. And v*iile the grief literature,
both theoretical and specific, is replete with descriptions of
behavioral and emotional changes wrouc^t by death, there has been no
attempt to systematically explore and document the changes manifest
at the level of one's assunptive world. The present study was
undertaken to examine how the experience of bereavement affected
individuals' assumptions and beliefs about life in general, their own
life, and how to ascribe meaning to the world.
First, it was predicted that bereavement would result in an
examination and reconceptualization of the bereaved individual's
assunptive world, and that these changes would remain incorporated in
the bereaved person's world views after the immediate event of the
loss. It was hypothesized that bereaved individuals would view the
world as less benevolent, less just, less controllable and more
random than individuals who had never been bereaved (or suffered any
other significant trauma)
.
Second, it was predicted that bereaved individuals would report
more psychological and emotional distress than non-bereaved, non-
traumatized individuals.
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Third, it was predicted that individuals v^o had been bereaved
would have a lower sense of self-esteem than individuals who had
never been bereaved or suffered a significant trauma. There were
several divergent paths that led to this hypothesis. First, the
interrelatedness of self-esteem and other aspects of the assuitptive
world (most integral in the theory of Epstein) would mean that as the
death significantly affects one's construction of reality, it would
also affect self-esteem.
Related to this, Janoff-Bulman (e.g. 1985) has documented the
relationship between victimization and lowered self-esteem. While
bereavement cannot be considered victimization per se, it is similar
in its calling into question beliefs about personal vulnerability and
one's role in the world. This change in perceived vulnerability in
itself may lead to a drop in self-esteem.
Also related to lowered self^orth is the feeling of guilt,
either behavioral or in a more characterological sense (as in the
phenomenon of "survivor" guilt) that is a common reaction to death.
In the Harvard Bereavement Project, Click, et al (1972) reported that
47% of the interviewed widows e^qpressed some self-reproach regarding
either the death or their relationship with their husband prior to
the death. A strong feeling of guilt may be a cause (or reflection)
of lowered self-esteem.
Finally, it was ejqjected that there would be associations
between an individual's assumptive world views, his or her
emotional/psychological state, and the intensity of his or her grief
over his or her loss. Specifically, it was predicted that: a) there
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would be a strong relationship between the intensity of grief and
psychological distress; and b) there would be a strong relationship
between the bereaved individuals' assumptive views and the intensity
of their grief, with the "higher" grievers beii^ less able to ascribe
meaning to the world.
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CHAPTER VI
TYPE OF BEREAVEMENT: FOCUS m WSS OF A PARENT
The present study was conducted with individuals vdio had
ejq)erienced the death of a parent within the previous 36 months.
There were several reasons for having selected this population.
First, despite the exploratory nature of part of the study, limiting
the population under observation to a certain age groiip and to a
certain type of loss enabled a more controlled scrutiny of the data
and more reasonable cortparisons between subjects.
Second, a preliminary screening indicated that there was a
significant population of college-aged students v^o had recently lost
a parent.
Third, this is a population of interest in its own ri^t, about
vAiich surprisingly little has been observed. While much has been
written about the effects of loss in childhood (cf . Osterweis,
Solomon & Green, 1984) , studies examining the consequences of
bereavement in adolescence are rare, as are studies of parent loss in
adulthood.
In order to examine the effects of bereavement on adolescents.
Balk (1983) interviewed 33 teenagers v*io had experienced a sibling's
death. He did not control for the recency of death (range: 4 to 84
months) . Subjects reported experiencing many of the same emotional
reactions to the death as adults: shock, confusion, depression,
anger, fear and guilt. Balk also gathered objective data on the
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teenagers' self
-concepts; however, this information is difficult to
interpret due to the lack of a control grxjup.
laGrand (1981) surveyed 1,139 students attending colleges or
universities in New York State regarding their e>q)eriences with
"loss." subtly more than a quarter reported having esqDerienced
"the death of a loved one or sudden death, " but no effort was made to
discern the type or recency of the death.
Studying parent loss in an adult population, Horowitz, et al.
(Horowitz, Kri^nick, Kaltreider, Wilner, Leong and Marmar, 1979;
Horowitz, Weiss, Kaltreider, Krupnick, Marmar, Wilner & DeWitt, 1984)
compared 35 adults seeking psychotherapeutic treatment after the
death of a parent with 37 field subjects vdio had also experienced the
death of a parent but v*io didn't seek treatment. No non-bereaved
control grov:^) was used. The field groi:^) consisted of 19 men and 18
women. The patient group consisted of 33 women and two men.
The patient groi:^ reported significantly more problems with
adjustment and symptoms of depression, although both groups reported
depression and intrusive mental ejqDeriences (as measured by the
Stress Response Rating Scale) . The patient group, in addition to
being overwhelmingly coirposed of women, had experienced a
significantly hi^er number of unejqjected deaths. At a 13-month
follow-i:^, after the patient groi:^ had been involved in a time-
limited dynamic therapy, there were no significant differences in
self-reported syiiptoms between the two groi:5)s. Still, the authors
conclude that "the death of a parent is a serious life event that
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leads to a measurable degree of symptanatic distress in many persons
v^o do not seek therapy" (Horowitz, et al., 1979).
Horowitz, et al. found that, regardless of the gender of the
subject, loss of a mother was a more difficult event than loss of a
father. This is in contrast to the findings of Birtchnell (1975)
,
vAio argued that the loss of the opposite sex parent is the more
difficult type of parent loss. Further, ccnparing the percentage of
recently bereaved individuals seeking psychiatric treatment (as
recorded in the North-Eastem Regional Psychiatric Case Register in
Scotland) with the expected numbers of recently bereaved adults in
the general population, Birtchnell found that the recent death of a
father, but not the recent death of a mother, was a significant
precursor to seeking psychiatric help.
Malinak, Hoyt and Patterson (1979) interviewed 14 adults v^o had
experienced the death of a parent 3-20 months prior to the interview.
While not an empirical study, their findings suggest that loss of a
parent can be a traumatic and inportant event in a non-clinical
population.
Adding another perspective, Osterweis, Solomon and Green (1984)
propose that a parent's death may serve as a "developmental push."
Given the change in familial roles and self-concept that such a death
may signify, they suggest that "the awareness that there are no
longer parents to fall back on may effect a more mature stance in
parentally bereaved adults \A\o no longer think of themselves as
children" (p. 85) . This may be especially true with a college aged
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population, for this groi^ is already at a juncture of changing self-
definitions.
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CHAPTER VII
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 54 undergraduates at the University of
Massachusetts. Twenty-seven had ej^ienced the death of a parent in
the three years prior to the study, and the remaining 27 were matched
controls. Bereaved subjects who were interested in participating,
but v^ose parent had died by either murder or suicide, were excluded
from the study.
Bereaved subjects were solicited by an announcement made by the
e3^)erimenter in large undergraduate classes. The majority of the
subjects were recruited from introductory psychology classes and were
not psychology majors. Potential subjects were informed of the
criteria for the study (e.g. the recency and type of loss) and were
told that the general aim of the study was to learn vtot their
experiences of bereavement had been like.
The non-bereaved control subjects were solicited by written
advertisement posted in a designated subject-recruitment area in the
psychology building. The recruitment poster asked subjects to fill
out questionnaires regarding their views of the world, themselves,
and their psychological well-being. Control subjects were thus not
informed that they were to be coirpared with a bereaved population.
Potential control subjects v^o indicated that they had ej^Derienced a
"significantly traumatic" event in the past three years (such as
severe illness, violent crime, sexual abuse, or any event that they
labelled for themselves as "significantly traumatic") were excluded
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from the study. Control subjects reived "e>^iinental credit" for
their participation. Bereaved subjects were given the option of
receiving ej^iniental credit or five dollars reimbursenvent. Non-
bereaved control subjects were matched with bereaved subjects for
gender, age, year in school, and, as carefully as possible, size of
family, religion, self-reported degree of religiosity of upbringing,
and SES.
Of the 27 bereaved subjects, six were excluded from the analyses
for the following reasons: two (a 37 year old male and a 39 year old
female) were too far out of the age range; one subject's father had
committed suicide; one subject reported about the death of her step-
father, v*iom she had never considered her father; one subject had
first filled out the control questionnaires before volunteering as a
bereaved subject (her father had died in the interim) ; and one
subject was judged by the ejqserimenter to be inappropriate due to a
presentation during vAiich suggested a long history of poor
psychological and mental functioning, regandless of reactions to his
father's death. Additionally, one subject, included in the
quantitative analyses, chose not to participate in the interview.
This left a final saiiple of 42 subjects (21 bereaved subjects with
their matched controls) , with 15 females and 6 males within each
groi^. For both males and females, there was approximately a 2;1
ratio of father loss to mother loss. Two female subjects had
e>5)erienced the deaths of both parents.
The mean age of bereaved subjects was 19.8 years old, and the
mean age of parents at time of death was 51 years old, with a range
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between 42 and 62 years, ihe deaths had occurred between 2 and 36
months prior to the tli»e of the study, with a mean of 19 months and a
median of 18 months.
Procedure
The study consisted of two parts, in the first part, all
subjects completed several objective measures, in order to make
conparisons between the bereaved and non-bereaved control subjects.
The second part of the study looked within the bereaved sairple alone.
To gain additional data regarding the experiences of this group, the
bereaved subjects participated in a semi-structured clinical
interview.
All subjects corrpleted the following objective measures: the
World Assuitptions Scale, or WAS (Janoff-Bulman, in press) ;
Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale; Synptom Checklist, or SCI/-90-R
(Derogatis, et al., 1977); I,P&C Scales for Locus of Control
(iBvenson, 1972) ; and the Mother-Father-Peer (M-F-P) Scale (Epstein,
1975)
.
Additionally, bereaved subjects conpleted the Texas Grief
Inventory, or TGI (Zisook, et al, 1982; Faschingbauer, et al., 1977).
The World Assumptions Scale is a 32-item self-report measure
designed to assess an individual's assunptive belief system.
Individuals rate items such as "There is more good than evil in the
world" or "The course of our lives is largely determined by chance"
on a six-point scale, with choices of strongly disagree, moderately
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disagree, sli^tly disagree, sli^tly agree, moderately agree, and
strongly agree.
The WAS examines three main belief systems: the benevolence of
the world, the meaningfulness of the world, and the worthiness of the
self. These main scales are comprised of ei^t subscales
representing more specific beliefs. Thus, the Meaning scale measures
an individual's beliefs in justice, control, and randomness. The
Benevolence Scale measures beliefs in benevolence of the world in
general and the benevolence of people. The Self-worth Scale is
comprised of beliefs in self-esteem, the perceived amount of self-
control one has in one's fate, and beliefs in self-perceived luck.
A second, 10-item self-esteem measure (Rosenberg, 1965) was
included to further examine the possible effects of bereavement on
beliefs of self-worthiness. Subjects responded to statements such as
"I am able to do things as well as most other people" on a 4 point
scale: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.
The Symptom Checklist (SCL-90-R) is a widely used instrument,
with ample normative data. It is a 90-item self-report scale
designed to measure emotional and psychological distress. Subscales
include somatization, obsession-compulsion, interpersonal
sensitivity, anxiety, depression, hostility, phobic behavior,
paranoia, and psychoticism. Subjects report the extent to v^ich, in
the previous week, they have experienced 90 possible symptoms.
Responses range from "not at all" to "extrejnely." A global measure
of distress, the Positive Syirptom Total, records the total number of
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positively endorsed items, regardless of the degr^ to v^ich each
item is endorsed.
Ibe I,P&C Scales for locos of Control (Levenson, 1972) is a 24-
item measure which expands the construct of internal vs. external
control by employing three scales: Internal, Powerful Others, and
Chance. I^venson augmented the locus of control model to this
tripartite structure to separate "external" believes in which an
individual believes in chance from those in which he/she believes
that control is in the hands of powerful others. Exaiiples of items
are "When I get v*iat I want, it's usually because I'm lucky" and
"Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other
driver.
"
The M-F-P Scale (Epstein, 1975) was included to provide
information regarding the nature of the relationship between the
subject and the deceased parent in the subject's childhood. Subjects
responded, for each parent separately, to such items as: "When I was
a child, ray (mother/father) encouraged me to do things for myself"
and "...my (mother/father) was someone I found very difficult to
please." The M-F-P Scale measures perceptions of
overprotectiveness, independence encouragement, rejection, and
acceptance with each parent. An additional measure taps parental
idealization. Malinak et al. (1979), in their interviews with adults
\i\^o had recently experienced the death of a parent, found that
subjects tended to idealize their deceased parent.
The Texas Grief Inventory, filled out only by bereaved subjects,
is a 58-item self-report scale vAiich measures the extent to v^ich an
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individual continues to grieve for a prior loss. The scale yields
three measures: one subscale for "present feelings" (here labelled
Present Grief)
;
a second subscale for "past behavior and feelings
ijnmediately following the object loss" (here labelled Past Grief) ;
and a global score for grief, here labelled Itotal Grief, combining
the two subscales. Saitple items are "Now I can talk about the person
without discomfort," "I feel guilty v*ien I think about higher," and
"I still get i^5set when I think about the person v*io died." Subjects
respond on a five point scale: completely false, nostly false,
partly true and partly false, mostly true, and cortpletely true.
The interviews with bereaved subjects took place usually within
one week after they had filled out the questionnaires. At the time
of the interviews, the interviewer was blind as to the subjects'
responses on the questionnaires. Interviews followed a semi-
structured format, with a list of specific questions to be addressed,
as much as possible, in a specific order. The questions were
designed to encourage an exploration of the subjects' attitudes and
beliefs about life and the world, and how these have been affected by
bereavement.
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CHAPTER VIII
RESULTS
Analyses indicated that, in this study, males and females did
not differ significantly on any variables. Analyses of Variance
indicated that there were no significant main effects of gender or
significant interactions between gender of the bereaved subject and
mother-loss or father-loss. Gender, therefore, will not be further
discussed.
Table 1 displays the reliability coefficients for all the
objective measures. As can be seen, all the scales, with the sole
exception of the Phobic Behavior subscale of the SCI/-90-R, proved to
be extremely reliable. The reliabilities for the three global scales
of the World Assunptions Scale — Meaning, Benevolence, and Self-
worth —were .76, .87 and .80, respectively. Correlational data for
the entire subject population on all relevant measures are presented
in the Appendix.
Comparisons Between the Bereaved Group and the Control Group
Analyses revealed that the bereaved and non-bereaved control
group differed significantly both on measures of psychological
functioning and measures tapping assumptive beliefs. Table 2 reports
the mean scores and the results of two-tailed t-tests on all measures
comparing the bereaved and non-bereaved groups.
On the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-90-R, a global measure
of symptomatic distress, bereaved subjects manifested significantly
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Table 1
Reliability Coefficients fnr- ai i Measnr^<.
Measure at i_ „ .Alpha Coefficient
World Assumptions Sca1f>
Meaning
Just World
Control
Randomness
Benevolence
.76
.75
.76
.67
.87
Benevolent People '73
Benevolent World
'giSelf-worth ]goSelf esteem 33
Personal Control gg
Luck [go
Self Esteem (Rosenberg)
.83
M - F - P Scale
Mother Overprotectiveness
.75
Mother Independence-encouragement
.85
Mother Acceptance
.81
Mother Rejection
.84
Mother Idealization
.75
Father Overprotectiveness
.74
Father Independence-encouragement
.88
Father Acceptance
.89
Father Rejection
.79
Father Idealization
.85
I. P. & C Scale
Internal
.77
Powerful Others
.71
Chance
.78
Texas Grief Inventory
Past Grief
.82
Present Grief
.87
Total Grief
.91
SCL-90-R
Somatization .78
Obsession-compulsion .86
Interpersonal Sensitivity .91
Depression .90
Anxiety .85
Hostility .78
Phobic Behavior .31
Paranoia .80
Psychoticism .81
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Table 2
Diff^ences Between Bereaved and Control Groups
on Assimiptive Beliefs, Psychological FunctioningTand
Perc^tions of Parent / Child Relationship
Measure
Bereaved Control t-value
Group Group (2-tailed) cif PMean Mean
Self-esteem 32 .57 32.19 .27 40 7Q
(Rosenberg)
World Assumotions Scale
Meaning 8 .10 13.00 -2.09 40 .04*
Just World 11 .33 12.95
-1.37 40 .18
Control 12 .38 13.90 -1.45 40 .16
Randomness 15 .62 13.86 1.52 40 .14
35 .81 36.38 - .26 40 .80
Benevolent World 17 .57 17.67 - .08 40 .94
Benevolent People 18 .24 18.71 - .43 40 .67
Self Worth 54 .67 57.29 -1.17 40 .25
Self-esteem 20 .00 19.90 .08 40 .94
Luck 16 .29 17.86 -1.40 40 .17
Persona 1 fV»n+-rr^l 18 .38 19.52 -1.44 40 .16
I,P&C Scale
Internal 34,.38 37.52 -1.72 40 .09
Powerful Others 22,.05 20.48 .91 40 .37
Chance 24..29 20.38 2.05 40 .05*
Mother Scale
Overprotectiveness 22.,38 20.86 .80 40 .42
Independence 29. 67 29.81 - .09 40 .93
Encouragement
Acceptance 36. 38 35.52 .61 40 .55
Rejection 9. 86 10.67 - .58 40 .57
Idealization 21. 62 19.71 1.14 40 .26
continued, next page
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Table 2 (continued)
Measure
Bereaved
Group
Mean
Overprotectiveness 21. 76
Independence 28. 81
Encouragement
Acceptance 33. 38
Rejection 12. 23
Idealization 19. 05
Control
Group
Mean
t-value
(2-tailed)
Father Scalf^
18.25
30. 10
31.85
13.05
18.30
1.82
-
.74
.75
-
.55
.36
df
39
39
39
39
39
08
46
46
59
72
SCL~90-R
Positive Symptom 4 0.19
Total
Somatization
.34
Obsession-Compulsion .59
Interpersonal
. 54
Sensitivity
Depression
.55
Anxiety
.49
Hostility
.40
Phobic Behavior
. 16
Paranoia
.50
Psychoticism .35
27.05 2.33 40
.
03*
.31 .37 40 .71
.46 1.49 40
. 14
.36 2 . 09 40 . 04*
.40 1.85 40
. 07
.26 2.72 40 . 01**
.26 1.55 40 . 13
.06 2.04 40 . 05*
.25 2.66 40 . 01**
.17 2.33 40 . 03*
£ < .05; p < .01
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more syitptcans than c»ntrol subjects (40.19 vs. 27.05, t (40) =
2.33, p <.05). T-tests also revealed significant differences
between the two groups on five of the nine subscales of the SClr-90-
R: anxiety (.49 vs. .26, t (40) = 2.72, p = .01); paranoia (.50
vs.
.25, t (40) = 2.66, p = .01), interpersonal sensitivity (.54
vs.
.36, t (40) = 2.09, p < .05), phobic behavior (.16 vs.
.06, t
(40) = 2.04, p < .05), and psychoticism (.35 vs.
.17, t (40) =
2.33, p < .05) . The difference between the two groups on the
depression subscale was marginally significant (.55 vs.
.40, t (40)
= 1.85, p < .10)
.
Analyses indicated that the two groups differed significantly
on the Meaning scale of the World Assumption Scale (8.10 vs. 13.00,
t (40) = -2.09, p < .05) and the Chance scale of the I,P & C scale
(24.29 vs. 20.38, t (40) = 2.05, p < .05). The bereaved group
reported higher beliefs in chance and lower beliefs in meaning than
the non-bereaved control group. As Table 2 indicates, the groups
did not differ significantly on any of the remaining variables.
To further explore differences between the two groups'
assunptive beliefs, a discriminant analysis was used to determine
v^iat best distinguished the two groups. All scales tapping beliefs
and the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-90-R were entered. The
best predictors of grief, each of v*iich (as discussed above) was
statistically significant indivdually, were the Positive Symptom
Total and the Meaning scale of the WAS. Taken together, these two
measures strongly differentiated the two groups (F(2,39) = 4.43,
Wilks = .81, p = .01)
.
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Ccfmparisons Within the Bereaved Group
In the next set of analyses, the bereaved sample was studied
alone, in order to detennine the variables that were associated
with intensity of grief. Table 3 lists the corr^ations between
the three subscales of the Texas Grief Inventory and the other
measures.
As was expected, grief was strongly associated with
symptomatology as measured by the SCI/-90-R. The correlation
between scores on the Total Grief measure of the Texas Grief
Inventory and the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-90-R was .57 (p
< .005)
.
The higher the level of unresolved grief, the greater the
level of self
-reported psychological distress.
Correlational analyses also revealed striking relationships
between the intensity of grief and the bereaved subjects' basic
assumptions. Perceived meaningfulness of the world, as measured by
the Meaning Scale of the WS, was negatively correlated with the
Total Grief measure of the TGI at r (20) = -.55, p < .01; the lower
the perceived meaningfulness of the world, the greater the
intensity of the grief. When the coirponent measures of
meaningfulness were examined (beliefs in justice, randomness, and
control)
,
significant correlations between these beliefs and the
Total Grief measure of the TGI were found for all three, indicating
that the greater the grief, the more the bereaved individuals saw
the world as random (r (20) = .38, p = .05), and the less they saw
it as just (r (20) = -.41, p < .05) and controllable (r (20) = -
.42, p < .05). Similarly, beliefs in chance and powerful others,
as measured by the Levenson scale, were also strongly correlated
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Table 3
I^ationship of the Texas Grief Inventory to Assumptive
Snfp'^^^^'S?^^ n^K^ioning, I^vei^S^/Quid Relationship, and Relevant Itometers of Grieving
Variable Past
Grief
Present
Grief
Total
Grief
Months since Death
-.16
-.49*
-.38*
Months warning of Death .22
.33 .31
Self-esteem (Rosenberg)
-.37*
-.17
-.28
Meaning
Just World
Control
Randcxnness
-.54**
-.36
-.26
.51**
-.48*
-.38*
.22
-.55**
-.41*
.37*
Benevolence
Benevolent World
Benevolent People
-.07
-.21
.08
-.10
-.20
.03
-.09
-.22
.06
Self Worth
Self-esteem
Luck
Personal Control
-.40*
-.34
-.15
-.34
-.33
-.24
-.11
-.39*
-.40*
-.31
-.14
-.40*
Internal
-.12
-.14
-.14
Chance
.56***
.55** .60***
Powerful Others .53**
.41* .51**
Mother Overprotectiveness .44* .48* .51**
Mother Indepeodence
Encouragement
-.35
-.28 -.34
Mother Acceptance -.07
-.07 -.08
Mother Rejection -.04
.12 .06
Mother Idealization .04 .01 .02
continued, next page
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Table 3 (continued)
Variable Past Present Total
Grief Grief Grief
Father Overprotectiveness .61***
.40* .54**
-.33
-.40*Father Independence -.41*
Encouragement
Father Acceptance
-.2 0 35 -.31
Father Rejection
-.02
-.03
Obsession-Compulsion .49** .42*
01
Father Idealization
.25
.16 .22
Positive Symptom Total .47* .55** 57***
(SCL-90)
Somatization
.45* .49* .52**
49**
Interpersonal Sensitivity .37 .37 .40*
Depression
.42* .57*** .56***
Anxiety
.25 .39* .36
Hostility
.05 .05 .05
Phobic Behavior .48* .59*** .59***
Paranoia
.25 .34 .33
Psychoticism .46* .57*** .57***
* E < .05; ** E < .01; *** p < .005; two-tailed
Note: degrees of freedom = 20.
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with grieving (r (20) = .60, p < .005 for Chance and Itotal Grief; r
(20) = .50, p =.01 for Powerful Others and Itotal Grief)
. The more
the bereaved subjects believed in chance and powerful others in
detemining outcomes, the greater their grief.
Self-vorth beliefs were also related to grieving. Scores on
the self-worth scale of the World Assumptions Scale were negatively
correlated (r (20) = -40., p < .05) with the Ttotal Grief score.
Rosenberg's self-esteem scale was significantly correlated with the
Past Grief measure of the TGI (r (20) = -.37, p = .05) . The
greater one's perception of self-worth, the less intense one's
grief.
In addition to being related to the basic assumptions of the
bereaved, the intensity of grief was strongly correlated with the
recency of death. The more time since the death, the lower the
reported levels of Present Grief (r (20) = -.49, p = .01) and Total
Grief (r (20) = -.38, p < .05) . In this study, v^ether the death
was sudden or unej^jected was unrelated to grieving response.
A t-test comparing subjects vdio had experienced their loss
within the past 14 months with those v*io had ejqjerienced the loss
more than 17 months earlier^ revealed significant differences in
grieving and in syiiptomatology between these two groups. Subjects
vAio had experienced a more recent death showed significantly higher
scores on the Present Grief measure of the TGI (101.56 vs. 86.00, t
(18) = 2.30, p < .05) . On the Positive Symptom Total of the SCL-
90-R, the more recently bereaved subjects reported significantly
^ In this sample, there were no subjects v^o reported the loss
to have been 15 or 16 months prior to the study.
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more synptams (50.56 vs. 32.83, t (19) = 2.23, p < .05). However,
there were no significant differences in basic assunptions between
these two groups. Siitiilarly, the beliefs measures, despite their
strong correlations with the TGI, did not correlate significantly
with the recency of the death.
Finally, Epstein's Mbther-Father-Peer Scale yielded a few
intriguing results. Contrary to e>$)ectations, no differences
emerged between the bereaved and control populations in terms of
parental idealization. However, within the bereaved population,
intensity of grieving was strongly correlated with degree of
reported parental overprotectiveness in childhood. These
correlations (r (20) = .51, p =.01 and r (20) = .54, p < .01 for
mother's overprotectiveness and father's overprotectiveness with
Total Grief, respectively) did not depend upon which parent had
died. Separate analyses for the mother-died and father-died groups
indicated that in both cases, the higher the reported parental
overprotectiveness, the more pronounced the grief reaction. Both
maternal and paternal overprotectiveness were also significantly
correlated with the Positive Syitptom Total of the SCL-90-R (r (21)
=
.45, p < .05 and r (21) = .43, p < .05 for maternal and paternal
overprotectiveness, respectively) . The greater the self-perceived
degree of overprotectiveness in childhood, the greater the current
psychological distress.
A stepwise multiple regression was used to determine v*iat was
most strongly associated with grieving. Entered into the analysis
were the three scales of the WAS (Meaning, Benevolence, and Self-
worth) , the amount of time (measured in months) since the death,
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and the scales for mother and father overpratectiveness. The
dependent variable was the Total Grief scale of the TCI. The
factors which emerged as most strongly associated with grief were
Meaning, Father overprotectiveness, and the months since the death
(F (3,16) = 9.73, p < .001) . Ihe R Square for this equation was
.65, indicating that taken together, these variables accounted for
65% of the variance.
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CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION OF QUANTITAnVE DATA
Several findings of the present study have already been fairly
well-established in the literature on grievii^ and are in acxx^rxi
with commonly held notions of grief in this culture. The overall
difference in symptomatology between the bereaved and control
groups, the high correlation between recency of death and degree of
grief, and the high correlation between the degree of grief and
syirptomatic distress are all previously documented and ej^jected
findings.
What emerged of note was the important role of certain basic
assumptions, particularly those related to perceptions of meaning,
in the grieving process. Not only did the bereaved and control
groi^ differ in perceived meaningfulness of the world and the
related perception of chance, but, among the bereaved subjects, the
intensity of grieving was strongly related to these beliefs.
The bereaved individuals experienced, amid the other changes
wrought by their loss, a serious i:pheaval in how they made sense of
the world. What was disrupted was the ability, found in their non-
bereaved, non-traumatized peers, to ascribe meaning to the world
with traditional Western concepts of justice and control. For the
bereaved individuals, events had come to be seen as more random,
people were viewed to have less control over their own fate, and
chance became recognized as a force to be acknowledged. As there
is no reason to assume that the bereaved subjects, prior to their
loss, held different assumptive beliefs than the control subjects,
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it seems litely that the bereavement was an event which, like other
traumas, led to a serious questioning, shattering, renegotiating or
redefining of how to ascribe meaning to the world.
It is also noteworthy that these alterations in belief were
not associated with the recency of the death. The beliefs did not
appear to change as a function of tiine within the grieving process.
Given the strong association between intensity of grieving and
these basic beliefs, it is interesting to speculate about the
possibility that once beliefs change (e.g., once one sees the world
as more meaningless) , these altered beliefs are likely to persist.
(In support of this interpretation is an eirpirical study by Janoff-
Bulman (in press) that found differences in basic assuirptions
between victims and non-victims ten to fifteen years after the
victimizing event.)
It is also interesting to examine how this bereaved sairple
differed from other traumatized populations, and specifically how
the bereavement did not alter subjects' beliefs in the benevolence
of the world (both the bereaved and control groups saw the world as
a benevolent place) . Unlike other traumatic events, bereavement
does not usually involve any breach of interpersonal trust, nor
does it violate any basic assunption of societal goodwill or
safety. Additionally, several factors may actually serve to
strengthen, rather than mitigate, an individual's sense of
benevolence in the world. The outpouring of social support v*iich
frequently accorppanies a bereavement (albeit not without its
dravfcacks, such as those discussed by Lehman, Wortman and Williams,
1987) , the strengthening of remaining familial and intimate bonds,
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and a newly discx3vered appreciation of the importance of close
interpersonal relationships may all enable an individual to develop
a more benevolent view of the world than he/she previously held.
Althou^ there were no belief-related differences among the
bereaved subjects in terms of vdiether the death was sudden or
anticipated, it is likely that the data fron this study are not
adequate to address the issue of the impact of sudden vs.
anticipated death. The data are confounded, in this regard, by
three factors. First, all but two subjects lost their parent to
natural causes, i.e. illness rather than accident. It is therefore
impossible in this study to determine, systematically and
comparatively, v*iat the effects of an accidental death may be on an
individual's assumptive beliefs. Second, several subjects reported
that the death was "sudden" and unanticipated, but then placed this
within a context of a long illness. It was the rare event of, for
example, death by heart attack with no previous history of cardiac
disturbance. Third, many subjects were aware of a lengthy illness
but not of the illness' severity. Most of the subjects were
adolescents at the time of their bereavement, and many felt that
they were shielded from knowing the severity of the situation as it
progressed. Several reported having had only short notice, perhaps
a matter of days or weeks, of a death v*iich other family members
had long been e3q)ecting. Thus, v^le it reasonable to speculate
that a death viiich is entirely urpredicted will lead to a greater
disruption in an individual's assurrptive beliefs, that question
cannot be addressed by this study.
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Within the bereaved saitple, the dramatic correlation between
the intensity of grief and the disnipted ability to ascribe nmning
to the world suggests that, for sane individuals, the loss was a
much more disturbing event—a more traumatic event—than for
others. A fuller examination of the relationship between the
intensity of grief and the disrription of previously held
assumptions is discussed in Chapter X.
The finding that the bereaved subjects did not idealize
their lost parent to a greater extent than the non-bereaved
subjects may be an artifact of the measure used to tap this belief.
The data suggest, in fact, that both groups idealized their parents
to a strong degree. Epstein (personal corranunication, 1988) has
recently updated the M-F-P scale to remove the parental
idealization measure, because of the finding that college age
students consistently score high on this measure. The qualitative
data suggest that for several of the bereaved subjects, but not a
majority, the death did result in an increased idealization of the
deceased parent. However, this phenomenon was only sporadically
reported, and parental idealization did not correlate in a
systematic way with the grief or belief measures.
The finding that self-perceived overprotectiveness in
childhood was strongly correlated with both intensity of grief and
self-reported psychological distress was une^q^ected. As already
noted, in determining the strength of the grief reaction, it did
not appear to matter if the overprotective parent was the one vAio
had died or the one v^io remained alive; v*iat mattered instead was
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the perception of overprotectiveness in childhood by either parent.
How can this datum be understood?
One ejqDlanation may be that the overprotected subjects would
have felt themselves ill-equipped to deal with any significant life
event v^ch required independence and a reliance upon their own
interml resources. When the major life event with v^iich they were
faced was in fact the death of an overprotective parent, the effect
was compounded by the very nature of the loss: not only did the
bereaved individuals face a major traumatic event on their own, but
the person whom they perceived would usually take care of the
trouble, or take care of them, was no longer there.
There is some reason to believe that the assumptive beliefs
that are most disripted for the overprotected subjects relate more
to their self-concept and self-worth than to how they ascribe
meaning to the world. While neither the overprotectiveness nor the
independence-encouragement^ measures of the M-F-P scale correlated
significantly with beliefs regarding meaning or chance, the
correlations of independence-encouragement were dramatically
associated with the self-esteem measures: Rosenberg's self-esteem
measure and perx:eived maternal independence-encouragement
correlated at r = .72 (p < .001) ; paternal independence-
•5
On the M-F-P Scale, the overprotectiveness and independence-
encouragement measures are conceptualized as the inverse of one
another, as are the acceptance and rejection measures. However, as
each scale is distinctly cotprised of different items, they do not
form absolute inverse relationships. In this sairple, the
correlation for maternal overprotectiveness and independence-
encouragement was -.57 (p < .005) ; the correlation for paternal
overprotectiveness and independence-encouragement was -.43 ( p <
.05)
.
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encouragement and the Rosenberg Scale correlated at r = .41 (p <
.05)
.
The more a subject perceived that he or she had been
encouraged towards independence in childhood (i.e., the less
overprotective he or she viewed his parents) , the greater his or
her self worth and the less pronounced his or her grief reaction.
Similarly, Epstein (in press) r^rts that perceived independence-
encouragement in childhood is more strongly associated with current
beliefs in meaning and self-worth than with specific life events.
In summary, it appears that the loss of a loved one
frequently served as a catalyst for the forced scrutiny of several
of an individual's fundamental, frequently tacitly held, beliefs.
This disrt^jtion was most apparent in the realm of ascribing meaning
to the world, and led to a decreasing ability to make sense of the
world in a previously acceptable manner.
Is it possible, or necessary, to place judgment on these
changes in assuirptive beliefs—is it inherently better or worse to
believe that events are distributed to people randomly, that
misfortune can or cannot be averted? Is one belief ri^t, the
other wrong? In terms of psychological distress, the data suggest
that there is not a siirple answer to this question: the inability
to ascribe meaning, so closely tied to the degree of reported
grief, made little difference in and of itself in terms of the
symptomatic distress as reported on the SCL-90-R. In other words,
a change in assurrptions regarding meaning need not be accompanied
by psychological dysfunction.
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To look more closely at this relationship between ineaning,
grief, and symptomatic distress, the qualitative interviews with
bereaved iixiividuals were analyzed in detail. The following
chapter presents an overview of the interview data, with specific
emphasis on how the bereavement affected subject's assumptions
regarding meaning.
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CHAPTER X
ANALYSIS OF QUAnETATIVE DATA I:
AN OVERVIEW
In order to gain more in-d^th data regarding the effects of
the bereavement on the individuals' lives and assunptive beliefs,
each bereaved subject was interviewed in an intensive, semi-
structured clinical interview. The interviews ranged in length
from 45 minutes to 3 hours; most lasted between 90 minutes and 2
hours. One subject, included in the quantitative analyses, chose
not to participate in the interview; 20 bereaved subjects did
participate.
Ihe scope of the interviews was broad. Each subject was asked
the same questions, in, as much as possible, the same order. Among
other points, subjects were cisked to describe their own grief
processes, coping strategies, family reactions, and relationship
with the deceased parent. Primarily, however, the focus of the
interviews was an examination of how the bereavement affected the
subjects' beliefs and assunptions. Many subjects spoke at length,
and often with great eloquence, about the changes they had
experienced because of their loss. These changes included
alterations in sane of their fundamental beliefs about life and how
they ascribe meaning to it. The subjects were also able to
articulate how the ejqjerience of the death, and the process of
mourning, changed their perceptions of themselves.
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How Bereaved Subjects Made Sense of thr^ Tr>cg
All but two of the subjects responded "Yes" to the question:
"Did you ever ask yourself ^Why (him or her) '?" One of these two
subjects reported that death is "scientific.
. .you're biologically
bom, you live biologically, and you die because your brain ceases
to function." He added, however, that his father "was a very sick
man, it's not like he was hit by a car," implying that somehow
there was an explanation, or meaning, to his father's death, but
not necessarily to all deaths. The second subject who did not ask
"Why?" stated that he "accepted it at its face value. . .there's a
tiine for everyone to die," and "[my father] was just sick and it
was time for him to die." For both these individuals, their
parent's death fit into an already established conceptual schema of
life without disn:^ing it.
However, the remaining 18 subjects, or 90% of the total, did
ask "Why?," suggesting that for the vast majority of bereaved
individuals, some of their basic assumptions were being questioned.
For scjme subjects, this questioning ended in a reconfirmation or
strengthening of previously held beliefs; for others, the death was
the catalyst for a dramatic upheaval in how they made sense of the
world.
Although nearly all of the subjects responded that they had
asked "Why," many then said that they had not found any answer to
this question. Fifty percent of the subjects stated that they had
never been able to satisfactorily answer the question of "Why," or
could only cinswer it by attributing it to fate, luck or chance.
One woman responded: "You can't help but have the feeling it's not
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fair.
.
.I'm still stuck on the why, I have to figure out why.
. .it
seems like there's no reason, almost like we were just picked out
of a hat." Another stated: "It was just fate or luck or whatever
you want to call it, and you can't ejq^lain it with a reason.
. .1
don't think there is any answer to those types of questions."
Fifty percent of the subjects, however, did find answers to
"those types of questions." Among this grtx:?), 50% of subjects
provided more than one response, but it was not the case that the
more explanations or reasons a subject provided, the greater the
sense made.^ some individuals found strong meaning in a single,
powerful ejqjlanation.
How did the subjects ascribe meaning to the death? Fifteen
percent attributed it to God's will. "God wouldn't have taken him
unless it was really necessary, " and "I think [her death] was a
final exam God was giving her, and she passed" were sample
responses from this category. Another 15% also believed the death
had some spiritual or religious meaning, but one v*iich they might
not necessarily comprehend: "I believe in God, and I believe that
God had a reason, but I don't know v^t it is," or "I believe
there's a force of good in the world, and v*ien good, strong people
die, they became part of that, and that's v^iere I feel she is."
One subject stated that she believed in God and felt that the death
^ Because many subjects responded with more than one answer to
this question—as well as to several of the other questions
discussed in this chapter—it follows that the reported percentages
of response will not necessarily total 100. The beginning of a
discussion of each question will report, from the total N, how many
subjects gave any response at all.
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was somehow "in [ray raother's] best interest," but could not say
how.
IWenty-five percent of the subjects found some meaning or
esqjlanation of the death in terms of their own lives and
development. Sample responses included: "His influence on me was
so great that I thought ^Maybe it's just time for me not to have
this anymore,' it's been a growing thing," or, more directly: "If
there was any reason, it was probably to open my eyes and force me
to grow i:^."
Subjects also explained the death in terms of pragmatic,
behavioral causes. Twenty percent attributed it, to varying
degrees, to their parent's health habits. This view was most
succinctly captured in the response of one woman: "Yes [I asked
vdiy], but he didn't take good care of himself. He was overweight.
He had the odds against him. He smoked." Another subject blamed
the doctors caring for her father, who were at fault "almost to a
point of negligence." In her search for an explanation of the
death, she added: "we think subconsciously he didn't want to go
throu^ with the [gall bladder] operation. He had a big fear of
hospitals."
Twenty percent of the subjects mentioned that death is
something you accept as a part of life: "things just happen,
there's no sense in fighting it. . .death is something you accept,
you don't try to e^qjlain." Related to this, several subjects
stated that they consciously make an effort not to determine a
cause or meaning: "Someday I'd like to find a legitimate answer to
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^Why her,
'
but ycxi can't go around askir^ it all the time. You'll
drive yourself crazy."
Finally, 15% of the subjects ej^lained the death to
themselves, at least in part, by stating how much wor^ things
could have been: "I think it happened because it was best for her,
rather than to go throu^ years of suffering." Related to this,
many subjects mentioned that they thou^t the situation was much
worse for their surviving parent than for them: "It's very
difficult for ray father...! lost ray raother, but he lost his wife.
He lost everything." (One can imagine the same cognitive strategy
to minimize the loss employed by the father: "It's very difficult
for my dau^ter.
.
.1 lost ray wife, but she lost her mother.
.
.
)
Through a variety of possibilities, then, many individuals had
found a way of explaining, understanding, conceptualizing, or
minimizing (at least cognitively) the death to themselves. This
need to explain the death, to find a reason or meaning in it, was
very pressing for some subjects; hence, the response of the subject
quoted above: "I'm still stuck on the v*iy, I have to figure out
v*iy." Subjects v^o had found an answer to the question "Why," be
it God's will or their mother's obesity, were striving to preserve
the assumptions v^ich had guided their lives before the
bereavement. By minimizing the disruption to their assumptive
beliefs, by holding on to or even strengthening the rules with
viiich they had previously made sense of the world, they were
attempting to minimize the possible traumatic impact of the event.
In fact, those v^o were able to provide an answer to the
question "Why"—^vtotever their answer (or combination of answers)—
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were grieving less than those who stated that they could not find
an answer, or attriJauted it to fate or chance, in a t-test
comparing these two qroups, the group that found no answer or
reason scored significantly hi^er on the Ttotal Grief measure of
the TGI than did the group that found sane ejq)lanation5 (184.90 vs.
162.00, t (17) = 2.20, p < .05) . In other words, the subjects v^o
were grieving the roost were those for whom the death was the most
difficult to mate sense of or find meaning in. Here is the
response to the question "Why" from the subject with the hi^est
score (the most unresolved grief) on the TGI: "I ask ^v4iy'
everyday. There isn't a day that goes by. I get so mad. I want
someone to give me that answer, and no one can. I don't think I'll
ever know that, ever find that out. It's so unfair."
How the Bereavement Affected Subjects' Religious and Afterlife
Beliefs
As mi^t be expected, the bereavement affected the religious
and spiritual beliefs of many of the subjects. Several subjects,
as detailed above, used religion to help find a meaning in the
^ This t-test also indicated a striking similarity between
this specific question—viiether or not an individual was able to
find an answer to the question "Why"—and the broader belief-
related categories of the World Assuirption Scale and the I,E,& P
Scale. The two groi:^ (those that found an answer and those that
didn't) differed significantly on the Just World and Randomness
measures of the WAS and the Chance measure of the I,E & P scale
(p<.05)
,
and, most dramatically, on the global Meaning Scale of the
WAS (12.70 vs. 2.00, t (18) = 4.81, p <.001). Individuals v^o
found no answer to the "Why" question showed much greater beliefs
in chance and randomness, and much lover beliefs in justice and
conventional ways of ascribing meaning, than the individuals v*io
found some explanation.
62
loss, others found comfort in the religious rituals that
surrounded the death and period of mourning. And a majority of the
subjects reported finding solace in, or a greater willingness to
entertain notions of, an afterlife.
For 50% of the subjects, the death did not alter their
religious beliefs, within this group, 70% (or 35% of the total N)
reported that they were not religious before the death, and did not
then became religious; 30% (or 15% of the total N) reported that
the death did not affect vdiat already was a strong religious
belief.
Twenty percent of the subjects indicated that ejqjeriencing the
loss had made them less religious. "I was raised religiously,"
said a subject v^ose mother had died of cancer, "but after
something like that happened, it's hard to have faith in God."
Another subject stated: "I've gotten to the point v^ere I've hated
God at times. I feel like ^how could he do that, ' because someone
had to have done it. God took him in the wor^t way. . .1 believe
he's unbelievably unfair."
Ihe remaining 30% of the subjects reported that their parent's
death led them to develop stronger religious beliefs. Some of
these subjects spoke in terms of organized religion, others
referred instead to a personal spiritual awakening. For exaitple:
A lot of ray ideas about death have changed in a more spiritual
nature. When things are fine and stable in your life, there's
not a real need for religion. . .but something like death makes
you feel a lot more vulnerable, and religion helped me gain
more strength, a more centered feeling.
One subject stated, quite sirrply: "It made me more religious than
ever. That's how I coped with it."
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Related to these changes in religious beliefs, 60% of the
subjects iixiicated that the death strengthened or altered their
belief in an afterlife. Of the 40% who reported no change in these
beliefs, 75% (or 30% of the total N) indicated that they already
had a strong belief in an afterlife, vdiile 25% (or 10% of the total
N) indicated that they didn't believe in an afterlife previously
and the death had not affected this belief.
The subjects' beliefs in an afterlife fell into three
categories. First, 25% of the subjects spoke of a strong, firm
belief in the concept of heaven. All but one of these subjects
placed this belief within the context of their strong and
traditional views of Christianity, with responses such as: "I
don't blame God. My mother says he's in a better place now, and
it's true."
Second, 10% of the subjects believed that an afterlife is
staying alive in the memories of people v^o are still living: "I
believe my mom has an afterlife because I remember her in ray mind
and my heart and I still love her. As far as heaven and hell, I
don't know."
The third and by far most common belief, mentioned by 60% of
all subjects, was that there is some sort of an afterlife, but vtet
this is can be only vaguely articulated or understood.
Interestingly, many of these subjects were aware that they chose to
believe in an afterlife, without wanting to seriously test or
question this belief, because it offered them comfort. One subject
stated: "I have to believe that there is an afterlife, and that
it's wonderful, that it just hasn't stopped, that this isn't the
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end." She added that her belief in an afterlife is due to her
mother's death: "I had no reason to be concerned or especially
worried beforehand, and now I have to believe that there's
something out there." Another subject, who believed in heaven,
told of the admittedly paradoxical nature of her beliefs:
"Sometimes [heaven] is hard to believe in v^ien I think about it, s(
I don't like to think about it too much because then it doesn't
make sense. I like to believe that, so I do, and I don't want to
question it."
It seems clear, then, that experiencing the death of a parent
had a significant impact on how these individuals used religious
beliefs to make sense of the world. Seventy percent of the
subjects reported a change in their attitude towarxis religion, an
afterlife, or both. Of the few subjects vdio reported that the
death registered no impact on these beliefs, all but two already
had strong religious beliefs. It is noteworthy that these two
subjects had several other similarities, including the fact that
they were among the lowest scorers on the TGI and the highest
scorers on the Meaning Scale of the V3AS, suggesting that, in
general, their bereavement caused little disruption in how they
ascribed meaning to the world.
How the Bereavement Affected Subjects' Self-Perceptions
Many of the subjects were able to articulate ways in v^ich
they felt their ejqjerience had changed them, in terms of their
self-concept, how they conducted interpersonal relationships, and
their beliefs and attitudes about life and the world. For some
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individuals, the changes could be characterized as negative, such
as seeing themselves as embittered, or with a diminished capacity
to triist other people. Other subjects r^rted primarily positive
changes, and spoke of how they were able to use the loss as a
catalyst for personal growth. Typically, individuals identified
several changes they had undergone, and the changes didn't fit
neatly into an all-positive or all-negative picture.
The data discussed here were gleaned primarily frm two open-
ended interview questions: "How, if at all, has the experience of
your (mother's/father's) death affected or changed you as a
person?"; and "How, if at all, has her/his death affected any
beliefs you have about life or the world in general?" The data is
presented in three general categories: interpersonal changes,
intrapsychic changes, and changes in beliefs and/or world view.
Interpersonal changes Seventy percent of the subjects spoke
of interpersonal changes in response to the questions above; the
remaining 30% either did not mention interpersonal issues or
spontaneously volunteered that they had not changed in this regard.
(Fifteen percent of the subjects responded that the death had not
changed them as individuals at all)
.
One half of the subjects regarded themselves as more open with
other people, more errpathic, or more caring than they had been
before the death; conversely, 30% of the subjects viewed themselves
as less open and less willing to trust. One subject, v*io had lost
both of her parents in unrelated incidents, stated: "I don't trust
people. I'm a little callous. I'm not a very sensitive
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person.
.
.When people cx^mplain about their problems, I have a hard
time accepting it." Another subject put her wariness of tnast this
way: "Something horrible has happened to someone you're close to,
and you don't want to see it happen again."
A few subjects reported a seemingly contradictory combination
of becoming both more and less trusting, or more and less
compassionate. One subject stated that she was more caring and
open with her immediate family, but less trusting of people in
general. The contradictory self reports of these subjects makes
sense vdien seen in terms of the upset to their assumptive worlds.
Iheir previous belief in interpersonal trust or benevolence has
been disrupted, and remains in a state of confusion or disarray; it
has likely not settled yet either in a new belief or a return to
the old.
Thirty percent of the subjects reported that they are less
reliant i^n other people or more independent: "I'm becoming more
independent; I relied on [ray father] a lot." Only one subject
enphasized that she is now more reliant i^n other people,
particularly her close friends.
Several subjects stated that they are now more honest in
interpersonal relationships or more appreciative of them. Some
reported drawing clearer lines in terms of vy*io is iiiportant to them
and v^o is not, and spoke of a greater capacity to trust people,
but a more focused world within which they do so. The majority of
subjects reported that they were closer with the remaining members
of their family.
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Intrapsychic charYTPS Ei^ty percent of the subjects were able
to identify changes related to their self-perceptions, in tenns of
ego strength, internal motivation or drive, or an ability to exert
contrcl in their lives. Only three subjects in the total saitple
presented these changes in a predominantly negative light; not
surprisingly, these three subjects were among those for vdion the
quantitative measures, and a subjective impression from the
interview, also indicated high levels of both grief and syirptomatic
distress.
Sixty percent of the subjects—more than half—r^rted that
the death had been a catalyst for positive growth or change.
Individuals reported that it had matured them, made them stronger
for having gone throu^ the ej^ierience, and had tau^t them lessons
about life which were important to learn. One subject stated that
in seme ways she felt "privileged" about having gone throu^ vdiat
she did, because of the wisdom she felt she had gained. Said
another:
It made me grow up much faster than I would have. I was 19
years old, but in many ways I was a baby. . .Her death made me
very strong—no, I was strcng to begin with. It made me have
to exemplify ray strength.
Twenty percent of the subjects reported that they were more
driven towards acconplishment, or more focused in v4iat they wanted
to achieve in life, because of the death: "It's made me more of a
filter. I don't quit things easily if they're not working out,
because Mom could have given up at any time and said it's hopeless,
but she never gave up." In response to the question of how the
death had affected her, another subject, v*io is taking pre-med
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courses, immediately answered: "it mde ine want to becx:«ne a
doctor.
"
In addition to these intrapsychic chaises, three subjects
r^rted that they had used the death to implement positive health
related changes in their life, such as quitting smokii^, losing
wei^t, or starting to exercise.
Changes in Reliefs ^nd wot-ih w-i^., Q^iy two subjects did not
inention a personal change due to the bereavement that could apply
to this category, within the remaining groi^, three other subjects
stated that they believed that some of their beliefs, such as a
belief in the fairness of life, changed because of the death, but
then they ""went back" to v^t they had been before; however, each
of these subjects also listed ways in vMch they felt they had
changed. Several subjects (35%) reported changes in religious or
spiritual beliefs, as discussed previously.
Forty-five percent of subjects felt that the experience had
led them to re-prioritize what they considered inportant in life.
Some said they stopped taking friendships and relationships for
granted; others reflected on how they considered themselves to have
always been fortunate or lucky, but never knew it. Said one: "I'm
more aware of love. That's another thing I took for granted. I
never thou^t about it before, but I think about it a lot now. " A
few spoke about how the loss put other difficulties into
perspective: "Before ray Mom died, the littlest thing that bothered
me I would think was unfair, liJce v^y did I fail this exam. . .but
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now, after the deaths, more important, significant things matter;
when you talk life and death compared to insignificant things.
.
Ihirty-five percent of the subjects mentioned that their
experience had left them feeling more somber or serious, like they
had a broader, deeper understanding of life. Many stated that they
felt older, maturer, that the death had forced them to "grow up-
more quickly than they would have. Some intimated that the pain of
the loss had taught them important but sobering lessons:
Before my mother's death, I had an optimistic point of view.
Now, I'm a little more realistic. .. it made me realize bad
things happen to everyone.
. .but I'm still pretty much an
optimist. Things happen. It's bad, it's sad, it's
unfortunate, but things happen.
Thirty percent of the sample indicated that the death called
into question a belief in personal invulnerability or immortality:
"It throws mortality in your face." "It puts the idea of finality
into you." One subject, while speaking about her diminished sense
of invulnerability, also commented on her surprise that this belief
wasn't totally obliterated. This subject's father was killed in a
plane crash seven months prior to the interview: "You never think
something like this is going to happen to you, it's always the
other person. You see it on TV, but it's people you'll never meet,
never know." She paused, and then added: "I still have the
feeling that nothing can happen to me but it's not as strong. . .1
don't know vdiy I have it at all."
Finally, 25% of the subjects reported that the ejqperience had
left them feeling more bitter or cynical about life than they had
been: "It made me think that life's not fair. I know it sounds
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Cliche and a lot of people say it, but it actually made me realize
it." Another subject tersely responded: "I think the world is a
much crueler place thani used to think.
. .the world's not fair, i
used to think that justice and goodness would always come through
in the end. It was a very idealistic belief, and a very sti^id
As these brief samples demonstrate, almost all of the subjects
were able to identify ways in vAiich their bereavement had affected
how they interact with other people, how they viewed themselves and
how they viewed the world. Many commented on how their experience
led them to examine beliefs vdiich they didn't know they held, but
vdiich nonetheless were fundamental to how they dealt with life.
It is interesting that so many subjects were able to identify
positive aspects of the loss. These were not individuals who were
denying the severity or the impact of the death; nor can these
subjects easily be categorized as those v^o were grieving much or
grieving little. Parkes (1988), in his model of psychosocial
transitions, suggests that the conc^ts of "loss" and "gain" are
best viewed as endpoints of a continuum, and, within the sphere of
human activil^, few events will be v^olly one or the other. It was
the exception, rather than the rule, for a subject not to be able
to identify some positive aspect of his or her experience.
Often, because of the magnitude of social convention, it
seemed as if there were a taboo against mentioning something
positive. This was typified by the subject v^o stated: "I've
gotten a little stronger frcm it," but then hastened to add:
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"that's not to say anything good ever comes from it, but I think
people do get stronger."
While many subjects were able to identify positive aspects of
their loss or alluded to possible benefits of their ej^ience,
only one subject, whose attitudes about life were profoundly
altered by her mother's protracted illness and death, clearly
acknowledged how much she had gained frxam the death. She was
unique among the subjects in that she was able to speak both of her
great sense of loss and, inextricably tied with it, her equally
great sense of gain:
The day she was diagnosed was rock bottom for me. . .1 felt like
the whole bottom had dropped out of ray world, that nothing
would be the same. But it's not like that. There's so much
good that came out of this.
. .Yes, it was hard, and if I could
choose I wouldn't have her die, because I still want her to be
here. But so many good things came out of that cancer!
There^s so much more health in ray family than there was before
that it was a gift. You pay for things; the price was to
watch her die, but the benefit we'll all have for the rest of
our lives. I'll be a different mother than I would have been
before. You can't measure that and say: Was it worth it? In
a sense, no, it wasn't. Part of me says I'd go back to being
the person I was before if I could have her back, I'd give up
all the advances I've made if I could have her here to talk
to. But part of me says No, you wouldn't. You had her, and
that was gift enou^. You got even more learning v*iat life
really is about, and it's about caring for people and loving
people and taking the tiine to do things that are important.
On a cautionary note, it is inportant to keep in mind that the
representative statements discussed in this section do not
necessarily convey the sincerity and gravity—or lack thereof—with
vAiich they were delivered. It would have been easy for subjects to
follow cultural or stereotypical expectations, and provide several
earnest-sounding platitudes to adequately address the questions
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asked of them. While it was seldom that I felt this to be the
case, two things did seem clear to me.
First, the deaths had varying levels of impact on different
individuals. The effects of the loss ranged from minimal to
profound, and these varying effects of the loss had a counterpart
in the varying degrees to vMch personal changes were felt. The
intensity or degree of awareness with v^ch various individuals
spoke about the changes was often indicative of how significant
these changes seemed to be. To help minimize the possibility that
subjects were presenting answers v^ch they felt to be appropriate
but vMch they did not believe, I did not include for analysis here
statements vdiich were made only after prodding, or which were in
response to a forced-choice option.
Second, some subjects demonstrated a much greater capacity for
self-reflection, or a greater ability to articulate their self-
reflections, than others. A few subjects reported that they had
never thought about these issues before; for others, it had been a
primary way of conceptualizing their bereavement. Some subjects,
then, were discussing changes v^iich they had already thought about
and reflected i^n; others were thinking about things for the first
time, and so at times felt more cautious about what they had to
say.
These caveats notwithstanding, subjects typically participated
in the interviews with an enthusiasm, self-awareness and openness
v\*iich seemed admirably honest. While subjects most likely brought
to the interview an investment in appearing a certain way (either
in the best, or, in some cases worst, possible li^t)
,
my sense was
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that the changes of vMA they spoke can be assumed to be genuii«,
or at least genuinely motivated.
Ways to Keep thP, Deceased Parent "AT We^»
Itost of the subjects revealed ways in which they had developed
cognitive strategies with v^ch, on sane deep, fundainental level,
they seemed to keep from fully admitting the finality of the loss.
In most cases, this process appeared to be citing beyond the ken
of the person's conscious awareness. Nonetheless, many statements
the subjects made lent themselves to systematic categorization, and
it was possible to determijie some of the ways in vAiich subjects
were attempting to keep the deceased parent alive.
Eighty percent of the subjects made at least one statement—
and 55% made two or more—which could be interpreted as an attempt
to lessen the reality or finality of the death, ihe most canmon
strategy was a new or invigorated belief in an afterlife. As
already discussed, many of the subjects who voiced a belief in an
afterlife did so knowing that they chose to believe this because
they found comfort in it. Scane subjects were quite ejqjlicit in
this function of their belief: "I assume now I believe in [an
afterlife] more because I want it to be true for my father, because
I can't imagine him not being anything anymore, him just being in
the ground, I can't believe that." One subject said simply: "I
believe there's a life after death. If I didn't believe that,
there's no way I could feel close to my father."
Half of the subjects spoke of ways in which they have kept
their parent alive internally by continuing to hear his/her voice
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giviiig guidance, judgment, ajpn^tion, or criticism.
"Sometiines I
find myself doing v^t I think they would e.^ me to do. i don't
do something that I think would disappoint them." "i tell myself
I'm doing things for her: I think she'd be prx^ud of me for
this.
. Related to this, several subjects spoke of how they use
their memory of the lost parent to motivate them or spur them on to
accomplishment, in a sense "dedicating" their efforts or
achievements as a tribute: "I use her as an inspiration, because
she never gave i^, and she was sick for five years." Said another:
The way I resolved my mother's death.
. .is that I sort of made
a deal with myself: I know that ray mother's happiest tiine was
v*ien people said to her, "You have a lovely family" or "Youhave beautiful children," so if I can go through life and showpeople what a good person I am because of my mother, she'lllive on throu^ me.
For one subject, this sense of living for her recently deceased
father was a source of confusion:
I'm always wondering if what I'm doing, and vAmt I'm going to
do in ray future, is for rae or for him. . .right after he died,
one of the first things I said was ^I'ra going to live for
him.' I don't know if that's v*iat I'ra doing or not; sometimes
I'm not sure vdio I'ra doing things for, me or him.
Thirty-five percent of the subjects communicated a strong
sense of identification with the deceased parent, or spoke of
specific ways in vMch they are similar to him or her. One subject
spoke of her identification with her mother as something
problematic, from v^ich she sou^t to free herself; for the others,
it appeared to be a source of comfort. All but one of these
subjects were women, and all but one of these women were
identifying with their deceased mother (i.e., the majority of
respondents in this category were women identifying with their
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mothers)
.
it is pertiaps noteworthy that of the 13 subjec±s who
lost a father, only one seemed to be stror^ly identified with him,
v^le six of the nine^ subjects viho lost a mother either spoke
directly of, or unknowingly ooraraunicated, a strong sense of
identification
.
Thirty-five percent of the subjects said that their parent
remained alive in their hearts or memory, such as the subject
already quoted: "I believe my room has an afterlife because I
remember her in my mind and my heart, and I still love her."
Several mentioned that talking about the parent also served this
function: "Talking about it doesn't make me feel upset, it makes me
feel good. It's like I'm keeping him alive."
As a final means of keeping a lost parent psychologically
alive, two subjects reported that they talk to their deceased
fathers. One reported that she goes frequently to the cemetery to
"talk to him and tell him vtet I'm doing." She added that "I don't
know if he can hear me, " but that it was a comfort to her.
Ihrou^ a variety of strategies, then, many subjects sought to
minimize or soften the finality of their parents' death. It is
interesting that three of the four subjects v^o, at least from the
data of the interviews, made no attenopt to do this were also,
according to the quantitative data and a qualitative irrpression,
not strongly grieving. Each of these four subjects reported having
a distant relationship with his or her father.
^ These figures includes the two subjects v^o lost both a
mother and a father; hence, the total is 22 deaths for 20 subjects.
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It is possible to examine this pattern of keeping the parent
alive from different perspectives. Psychoanalytic theories of
grief (cf
.
May, 1988) speak explicitly about the role of
"inten^ization" in regard to a loss. Freud (1917) argued that
one of the tasks of bereavement is to intermlize the deceased
loved one in a way in which he or she is positively identified with
the self, other psychoanalytic theorists (e.g. Klein, 1940) , for
v^cm internalization is already an ongoing and given prxx:ess,
suggest that bereavement involves addressing the necessary changes
to the interralized object after a real loss, in both of these
approaches, the pAienomenon of keepirig the deceased parent alive
involves not wantijig to relinquish a tie to the deceased person.
In terms of understanding bereavement as a traumatic event
that disn^ts one's basic assumptions, keeping the deceased parent
alive may also be seen to serve an important function: to lessen
the assault on one's fundamental assunptions. Rather than have a
belief be vdiolly shattered or nullified, it can be elasticized, or
acccframodated to. By at some level mitigating the finality of the
loss (vMle not denying the factual reality of the death)
, one's
assumptive world can largely be preserved, the structure of the
beliefs can remain in place.
A Few comments on the Question: "Is Life Fair?"
Did the bereaved subjects believe that life is fair? A belief
in fairness is one of the most fundamental assunptions of how we
construe the world. (To underscore the tenacity and depth of this
belief, simply call to mind a child's ccaiplaining refrain about the
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slightest peroeived injustice in his or her life: "it's not fair!"
- implying, of course, that things should be fair)
. a belief in
fairness involves not only a belief in justice, but also a belief
in benevolence; linguistically, this compound meaning is revealed
in how "fair" means both "just" and "good." Hence, individuals'
beliefs in fairness are usually tilted towards vtet is positive for
the self: v*ien the child complains "It's not fair!," he or she is
also saying, in part, "I deserve it."
Althou^ the question "Is life fair?" was not directly asked
in the interview, many subjects spontaneously commented on it, at
times providing complex and paradoxical views of their perceptions
of fairness. What frequently emerged was an understanding of
fairness in terms of relative personal benefit: ^en good things
are happening to you, life is fair; v^en bad things are happening,
it's not fair. Hence, many subjects said that immediately after
the bereavement they began to feel that life was unfair, but they
regained a sense of fairness once they began to recover from the
immediate distress of the loss.
A few subjects reported that they continued to believe that
life was unfair, and that their previous beliefs in fairness had
been illusory. Others maintained that life was still fair, but
that they (or their parent) had e5^)erienced bad luck. By
attributing the event to unluckiness, they could still maintain a
fundamental belief in the fairness of the world.
One subject commented on how the concept of fairness was no
longer meaningful. It's not that things were either fair or
unfair; things just were. She said:
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Is life fair? No. (Pause)
. Yes. (Pause)
. it's fair in abad way Bad thii^s happen to v^nderful picple, LfSiSs^happen to the worst pecple in the world, a S^Sion
at girS^f'? seer. juvSiL'tr^SIt in terms of fair or unfair.
Perhaps the most paradoxical attitudes towards fairness and
justice were demonstrated by a woman v^o had recently lost both her
mother and step-father of many years, ihis subject was a devout
Christian v^ose main focus in life, in part due to her mother's
death, was Christian ministry. Althou^ she ascribed meaning to
the deaths of both her mother and her step-father, the meanings
were contradictory and reached via totally different paths.
Her mother, also a devout Christian, died because "God. . .was
doing it for a reason, he was in control. . .He knows v*iat he's
doing, and ultimately, he causes all things to work together for
the good." Her step-father, however, was not Christian, and at
first she said that "for [him] , I can't figure out v*iy it
happened.
"
She then went on, however, to attribute his death to
reasons different from those relevant to her mother: "I think his
cancer was a result of stress and feelings: I think he felt very
guilty about how he left my mother and it was really eating at him,
and that's vdiat killed him, that's v^y he got cancer." She stated
that his death was also somehow related to the fact that "he wasn't
Christian." This statement was in contrast to her previous
assertions that her mother's death was best understood specifically
because of her Qiristianity.
For this subject, the need to make sense of and ascribe
meaning to her losses was apparent. What united these two
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divergent explanations «as the fact that sane ej^planation, in and
Of itself, was required.
Additionally, this example shows the paradoxical and self-
enhancing ways in vMch beliefs in fairness may function: the
mother's death was seen as reward, the step-father's death as
punishment or justice. The step-father somehow deserved to die,
the mother earned the privilege. The "fairness" of the deaths
became a secondary matter, as did a coherent and logically sound
belief system; each was less iiiportant than the need to find a
sufficient meaning and to thus maintain a framework for
understanding the world.
This diapter was included to provide an overview of the impact
of bereavement on the assumptive beliefs of these subjects, as they
presented it in a semi-structured clinical interview. The
discussions of how the subjects ascribed meaning to the death, how
they felt it changed them interpersonally and intrapsychically, and
how it affected their beliefs about life, the world, religion and
an afterlife, all speak to changed assumptions. Given the wealth
and diversity of responses, it is clear that the ej^jerience of
bereavement had significant, and at times profound, effects on some
of the most fundamental beliefs by which these individuals ascribed
meaning to their worlds.
Given this general overview of the territory, it now becomes
possible to looks more closely at how various beliefs relate to one
another, and how changes in assuirptive beliefs affected specific
individuals. The following chapter discusses in detail the
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assumptive worlds of four individuals, and my shed some li<^t on
how these beliefs function in the context of specific lives.
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CHAPTER XI
ANALYSIS OF QUAUTATIVE DATA II-
HOW SUBJECTS ASCRIBED MEANING: CASE STUDIES
As already detailed, there was oonsiderBble variability in
subjects' responses to how they ascribed meaning to the world.
This variability was evident on the Meaning scale of the World
Assumption Scale and in the clinical interviews. Additionally,
there was a striJcing relationship between the amount of unresolved
grief, as measured by the Texas Grief Inventory, and meaning-
related beliefs, with the "low grievers" typically scoring high on
beliefs in justice and control, and the "high grievers" more
frequently believing instead in randomness or chance. This inverse
relationship between the two measures was also reflected in a more
subjective impression, derived from interview data.'^
Were there systematic similarities and differences in the
subjects who scored high on meaning vs. those who scored low, in
addition to how they ascribed meaning to the world? In this
chapter, I will present a more comprehensive, clinically-oriented
view of four subjects. Two of these subjects scored high on
A ranking of the subjects' grief and meaning-related
beliefs, based on qualitative data from the interview, produced a
ranking quite similar to that of the quantitative measures. There
were, however, a few exceptions. On the subjective (interview-
based) grief measure, I underestimated the grief score of one
subject and overestimated it for two. The two subjects vtiose
amount of grief I "overestimated," in the sense that they scored
low on the TGI, both presented as depressed and greatly disturbed
by the loss. Interestingly, despite their low grief scores on the
TGI, they also scored low on meaning, vy*iich was a break from the
usual pattern of 1cm grief, hi*^ meaning, or vice versa. The one
subject v^ose meaning score I most dramatically erred in estimating
was also an exception to the usual pattern, scoring both high on
grief and hi^ on meaning.
82
meanii^ and lew on grief, with their tereavenent causing apparently
little disn^ion to their conceptual systems. Conversely, the
other two are subjects who scored la. on meaning and high on grief,
i.e. subjects for v*iam the bereavement was a greatly disrupting
event in how they ascribed meaning to the world. These four
subjects have been selected because they are representative of the
most common pattern found in the data, i.e. an inverse relationship
between intensity of grief and an ability to maintain meaningful
sense of the world. These vignettes may shed light on what is
associated with these differing conceptual frameworks, and viiy the
loss affected the conceptual systems of some subjects so strongly,
and others so minimally.
^
While representative, these case presentations are not meant
to inflexibly portray the entire population; not every subject fit
into the predominant pattern. A small minority of subjects did not
fit this pattern at all, demonstrating either a hi^ level of grief
and a continued strong ability to believe in justice and control,
or a small amount of grief with greatly disnapted beliefs in
meaning. Nonetheless, the general pattern of high meaning/low
grief or low meaning/high grief was the rule to which there were
few exceptions. The cases discussed here, all exemplative of the
typical pattern, were chosen because they most clearly demonstrate
these two differing responses to bereavement (hic^ meaning/low
^ The subject with the hi^est score on the Meaning scale of
the WAS was the one subject v^o participated in the quantitative
section of the study, but then chose not to continue with the
interview. While this is an intriguing datum, by its nature it
does not lend itself very well to scrutiny or speculation.
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grief or lav ineaning/high grief)
. highlight the differences
between the two, the cases were selected from the extr^ of the
data, and it my thus be inferred that the majority of subjects
displayed a siinilar pattern to a less pronounced degr^.
Subjects For Whom thej Death H;^d Little Tmp^^H-
Case 1: Miciiael Michael was the subject who scored highest on
the Meaning scale of the WAS, and lowest on the TCI. He was also
among the lowest scorers on the self-report SCIr-90-R, indicating that
he perceived himself to be experiencing minimal psychological
distress. At the time of the interview, he was a 20 year old junior
at the university. His father had died, at the age of 59, ten months
before.
Michael reported that his father had had a long history of
hypertension and strokes, and Michael had "acclimated to seeing him
sick." Michael emphasized several times that his primary response to
his father's death was "relief...! didn't see my father's death as a
reason for sadness, but rather for relief, an end to his suffering."
He said that he had never asked himself why this had happened to his
father:
I accepted it at its face value. My mother couldn't understand
why such a good man would be taken, but I never looked at it
that way. There's a time for everyone to die, good or bad...
I
didn't feel like I had gotten the short end of the stick by
losing my father \4ien I was a young man.
Michael had a strong belief in Catholicism, a belief which had not
been affected by the death, and, in general, his "attitudes about
living and about death have remained relatively unaffected."
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In the interview, Michael spoke intelligently and articulately
about his reactions. However, most striJcing in his presentation
was the profound lack of emotion in his responses. He spoke
forcefully and earnestly, but with a voice devoid of emotional
inflection, and with responses lacking emotional content.
Invariably, he deflected questions calling for emotional responses
by saying '-My mother feels..." or "my sister feels...", or he would
instead offer details of his father's illness.
Michael stated that the death "upset" him, but that he quickly
recovered from this feeling of upset. Somevtot defensively, he
e3q)lained that grief is "very different for each person, and
different people adjust differently." He reiterated frequently how
the death had not been difficult for him and how he had already
passed being i:?)set by it. It was particularly dramatic and
surprising, then, when he suddenly began shaking with sobs and
found hiinself momentarily unable to continue with the interview
because he was crying too deeply.
The incident which led to this pronounced but brief shattering
of his defenses is instructive in terms of how Michael maintains
his sense of meaning in the world. He was talking about visiting
his father in the hospital:
The thing that was most li^jsetting to me was going into the
hospital one ni^t. My father was in a coma, and I just stood
in the doorway and watched him. (Begins crying strongly) . He
was struggling very hard to breathe, and that was very
i:^)setting. I found it hard to watch. . .that was the most
difficult thing for me, watching him fight so hard.
I later asked Michael v^iat was so difficult emotionally about
that incident. He answered:
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Seeing him fightijng so haid a losing cause. It was UDsettincito^ tan fighting so hard to ^ive «hen 1 kn^h?^^
He then added:
I'm a person who feels I'm in control of my destiny and thincfsI want^ Things I want to have happen I ca?i have a iS^of^in, and It had gotten beyond that point for him. He was no
'^of Ss^! ^ and I felt badly that thirds had^ taken
Michael's brief breakdown of defenses was not triggered by a
sense of loss; it was the fear of losing control, or, more
precisely, a brief, fri^tening recognition that not everything can
be controlled—a severe threat to one of the central assumptive
tenets of his life. Above all else, Michael is a man v^o needs to
maintain a belief in his control over every aspect of his life.
The need to perpetuate this belief included conceptualizing his
father's death as a relief and as a part of the expected plan of
things, rather than as a disrupting loss. He revealed the
investment he has in not having his assumptive beliefs about
control, or meaning, disrupted:
I think, looking back on it, that his death was not as
traumatic as it seemed then. Seeing him for two weeks
fighting very hard to survive was very traumatic, but. . .v*ien I
look at it now, I see the fight he put up against his illness
as an extension of his character. So the trauma of it is much
less now than it was then; the distance has helped me put it
into perspective.
To help maintain his strong belief in absolute personal
control, Michael reinterpreted a traumatic event—^watching his
father struggle in vain to breathe—as an "extension of [his
father's] character." By doing so, the trauma no longer becomes a
threat to his belief in control. Rather than allow that
uncontrollable events happen, Michael ei^lained the event in a way
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^* »axlaized persoml control and kept a sense of powerlessness,
or lack Of control, far fr«» conscicxasness. Micteel was determnel
not to have his belief in control shattered, for it is central to hov,
he understands the world and his life.
-^^^^ Jane was anl8 year old freshman whose father had
died of a heart attack 27 months prior to the interview, she scored
high on the WAS Meaning scale (her rank was third), and she was the
second lowest scorer on the Present Grief measure of the TCI (Michael
was the lowest)
.
m contrast to Michael, she had an elevated SCI^90-
R score, suggesting some degree of psychological difficulty, she
presented in the interview with a flat and somev^t depressed affect,
and had a harder time than most subjects with questions reganiing
self-reflection or insist.
From her own reports, any possible current depression was not
due to the loss of her father, for this had had only a minor iitpact
on her. After his death, she felt "sad for about three months," but
then "a lot of things started happening: the prom, I got a
boyfriend, stuff lite that." Realizing that "the family could go on"
was also inportant to her. She acknowledged that she "probably
didn't think about it as much as other pecple in similar situations."
Like Michael, she was somev^iat defensive about her muted grief
response.
Jane's father's death did not disn4)t her beliefs about the
orderliness and justice of life. After he died she asked herself
"why him," but had a ready answer: "He didn't take good care of the
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himself. He was overweight. He had the odds against him. He
smoked." I persevered with tMs line of questioning, only to find
this belief was strong for her:
Interviewer: So in answer to the question ^Why him ' wouldyou answer that it was because he didn't take Lre if ISJself?
l^'r./ ^ttri^te it to that, but I do wonder v*iy,kind of But still. It wasn't like (snaps her fimers) h4 wasin great shape and then he died. ^
Jane also had a deterministic attitude about matters of life
and death, v^ch remained unaltered by her bereavement: "When your
number's i^, it's up." she did not consider herself religious and
did not feel that the death had any impact on any of her beliefs or
attitudes about life.
Jane did not appear to have much access to her inner world or
to the emotional worlds and responses of others. When I asked her
hcM she thou^t her mother had reacted, emotionally, to the loss,
she answered: "I can't even imagine. We [in ray family] just don't
talk about our feelings." It is important to note that Jane did
not perceive her lack of emotional vitality to be a problem, at
least at this point in her life.
Jane's interview was noteworthy for the great distance and
lack of attachment she ejqjressed regarding her father, in his life
and his death. Underneath her flat affect, occasional glinpses of
anger and bitterness towards him would show through. She hinted at
negative aspects of their relationship: "We weren't really
close.
.
.He wasn't the kind of father v*io you'd go to with your
problems.
. .it wasn't like he used to do a lot of things for me. He
didn't do a lot of things for me." At one point, she said: "If I
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«ere closer to hm. I'm sure it would have done a lot more to me
than it did."
However, contrary to theories which postulate that ambivalent
personal relationships lead to pathological grief reactions (e.g.
Freud, 1917; Click, et al., 1974), these unvoiced feelings did not
appear to be prolonging Jane's grief. Jane did not appear to be
grieving, or to have grieved, but this lack of emotional
functioning likely predated, and siperx:eded, her loss. In fact,
the sense I got was that the unspoken (but not necessarily
conflicted) reality for Jane was that her father's death was a
relief to her. From the minimal interview data, it is conceivable
that their relationship was significantly more estranged and
problematic than she alluded to.
For Jane, the world is a just place. She believes that people
get v*iat they deserve and that misfortune is least likely to strike
worthy, decent people. The tenacity of this belief was apparent in
how she attributed her father's death to his lack of taking care of
himself, as if he somehow deserved vdiat he got. Conceivably, at
the level of her assumptive beliefs, Jane believed that her father
did deserve to die. They were not close, he was not a good father,
and she always perceived herself as independent.
Rather than these thoughts causing a conflict and resulting in
a pronounced grieving response, as they would with some other
people, Jane's history of blunted emotional functioning predisposed
her to having no grief response, or a minimal one. She interpreted
the death in a way vdiich was consonant with, and even reinforcing
of, her belief in justice. Cood people get vihat they deserve, her
89
father was not a good person, arxi so it made sense that he got v^t
he did. Jane did not want to acknowledge any potential threat to
this belief system, or to admit the possibility of unresolved pain
regarding her ambivalent relationship with her father and his loss.
She preferred to keep this all away fram conscious scrutiny, and
she protected herself with a willful denial: "[His death] seems so
long ago. it's one of those things that you put behind you."
Jane and Michael had several similarities in their responses
to the death and in how they made sense of the world. Neither
regarded the loss as an event of significant emotional impact
(neither actually regarded the death primarily as a "loss")
.
Neither had an expressive emotional style. Both used denial and
rationalization to defensively maintain their beliefs in justice
and control. Both reported conflicted or distant relationships
with their fathers; significantly, neither said anything v*iich is
suggestive of a need or desire to keep their deceased father
alive.
^
From the case discussions of these two subjects, it seems
that having a distant relationship with the deceased parent may
have been a significant factor in the low grief and high meaning
pattern v^iich they di^layed. However, there are two items of
relevant data suggesting that this pattern may not be
generalizable. First, all subjects were asked to report, on a five
point scale, how close their relationship was with the deceased
parent in the two years prior to the death. This measure did not
correlate strongly with either the grief or meaning measures.
Second, other subjects with a similar response profile of Michael
and and Jane did report having had a close relationship with their
lost parent. Therefore, v*iile the distant relationships both
report are important in understanding their particular cases, there
does not appear to be strong support for the notion that a distant
relationship, in and of itself, will minimize disruption of an
individual's assumptive beliefs.
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Both Jane and Michael were individuals whose need to maintain
their assumptions about meaning took pr^ence over, and shaped
their interpretations of, the deaths. The question arises, of
course, v^ether they were cxping well or were, instead, subsumed in
pathological denial. On the one hand, the defensive arroor of
Michael and Jane was extremely protective of any possible assault
to their basic beliefs, and both denied any sense of loss or pain.
On the other hand, at least Michael, the more articulate and
insightful of the two, appeared to be functioning well in his life
and was aware of his controlled personality. He reported he has
close friends, a girlfriend, and greatly values intiinacy in his
life. He does well scholastically and acts responsibly upon his
sense of concern about his mother. He was able to reflect on his
lack of emotionality, and, v^ile somev»tet defensive about it,
maintained that this is how he best functions.
By the guidelines of any traditional stage model, Jane and
Michael have not really grieved. Yet Michael maintained he is
coping and functioning well, and there was little in his
presentation to suggest otherwise. For him, coping well meant
maintaining an intact belief in control, and this belief allows him
to function productively and find meaning in his life.
In a qualified sense, Jane, too, couJ.d be said to be coping
well. The qualification is that Jane's lack of connection to her
emotional life seemed more pronounced, and more pathological, than
it did for Michael; within this context, however, Jane was coping
well with the specific event of the death. She had mastered it in
a way in v^ich it did not further impede her ability to function in
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the «orld. For Jane to nate^ of events, she needed to believe
that laws Of justice prevail. Ey understanding her father's death m
a way which was concordant with this belief, she mairtained the
conceptual system which allowed her to make sense of the world around
her.
Subjects For Whom the PPath Had significant Tmp^H-
Case 3: Shamn Sharon was a 21 year old senior at the tiine of
our interview. Her 55 year old father, who had died of pancreatic
cancer seven months before, had first been diagnosed three months
prior to his death.
Sharon presented as an extremely verbal and emotionally
expressive young woman. There was a large range to her emotional
responses: she frequently cried, expressed anger, and also spoke
emphatically of her gratitude towards some of her friends. She had a
dramatic, flamboyant verbal style and spoke of things, such as the
details of the disease, in vivid detail. Ihis style of extreme
response was reflected in the quantitative measures: Sharon was the
lowest scorer on the Meaning scale of the WAS and the highest scorer
on the Present Grief and Total Grief measures of the TGI. She was
the second highest scorer on the SCL-90-R, indicating a great deal of
self-perceived psychological distress.
Sharon was greatly affected by her father's death. "It's
amazing Vs*iat something like this can do to you," she reported, and
then gave many indications throughout the interview of how true this
was for her. She said she thinks and talks about the death
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"all the tinie." she has "fearful dreams" that her mother is going
to die. She feels she's "weaker emotionally" and doesn't trust
people anymore. Althou^ she used to be religious, she started to
"hate God" because "he took him in the worst way.
. .if it was
something like a heart attack, that would have been easier." she
advised other people in her situation:
This is how it goes usually. You'll be okay for a \Aiileyou'll cry every now and then, but you'll be just fine 'Andthen It will hit you like a ton of bricks. You'll probablv bedevastated. ^
The death shook many of Sharon's fundamental beliefs about
life and death. She came to believe that "everything is based on
luck, on chance," and added that she "hadn't thou^t about [these
topics] beforehand, and, even if I did, I probably wouldn't
remember, because this has had such an impact on me." She used the
phrase "unbelievably unfair" to describe both her father's death
and her current attitude about life. She couldn't understood v*iy
it happened, but asked herself this question everyday. She felt
corrpelled to find an answer, and was frustrated because she
believed she never would.
Sharon's assunptive beliefs were shattered by her bereavement.
Her old beliefs were no longer capable of making sense of the
world, but she had not yet found different beliefs to replace them.
This conceptual struggle was symbolically encapsulated in Sharon's
descriptions of vdiat she thou^t about when she remembered her
father:
At first [shortly after his death] , I would only be able to
see him like v^en he was very sick. He weighed 118 pounds, he
was very regressed. Right when he died, he opened his eyes
and looked at each and every one of us. . .and when I used to
93
think about him that's what I would see, that face i thirfc
^^^^y ^ living is. I SSqht a^S^tije last breath that he took. I wishT? had nev^^
Recently, however, this graphic and traumatic image had been
replaced by memories of her father when she was a young girl:
Now, I think of pictures, moments back when we were living on
——— Street. Life was so simple then. I think aboutthe times we shared at the old house.
For Sharon, the vivid image of her deteriorating, dying father
captured, in microcosm, the trauma of his death. This image, so
disturbing to her, was replaced—a symbolic enactment of her desire
to minimize, ignore, or fend off the trauma—by a more gentle and
nostaligic image of her life as a young girl. By doing so, she was
attempting to recapture and reinvigorate her old understanding of
the world by focusing on an idealized past. However, this model
was no longer viable. She could not return to her old beliefs
because they were no longer functional. One way of understanding
the pain of her loss is that, conceptually, she had no place to go:
her old beliefs were outdated, and there was no new framework to
take its place.
The question arises as to why Sharon was having so much
difficulty relinquishing her old beliefs. One answer, in this
case, lay in her unresolved feelings towards her father. She could
not return to her former beliefs not only because they were no
longer viable, but because she had been left with strongly
ambivalent feelings about her relationship with him:
To this day, it bothers me that he once said: "I'm really
proud of you, you remind me of your sister, Marilyn." And I
thou<^t, ^No, I want to get credit for being me. ' To this
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enough for hm, that I isn't thTlaS^hf^LTS to^S^
L^TtiiL-?;^^a.^s'har^t*^kTi4?-^
Sharon could not leave her old beliefs behind and start
reconstnicting a ineaningful view of the world because she was hopir^
to seek solace in her old assunptions. she wanted to find within
them the love, security and meaning vAiich she felt she had lost.
However, she was caught betwixt and between, and therein lay the
source of the pain: she had no new framework, and her old framework
could not provide comfort because she could not fully believe in
that, either. Her memories of early, good times were an attempt to
hold on to an idealized past, but her actual past she viewed as more
conflicted and ambiguous, she had no new framework, and her old
framework was not only faulty now, but perhaps was faulty to begin
with. She could neither embrace the past nor reject it, she could
move neither forward nor back, and so she remained stuck, amazed "at
what something like this can do to you."
^^^^ ^'—Kathy Kathy was an ei^teen year old freshman. On the
quantitative measures, she scored relatively low on Meaning and hi^
on Total Grief and Present Grief. In the interview, she presented as
having found an appropriate balance between emotionally acknowledging
the reality of the loss and continuing to function well and adapt to
college; however, her SCL-90-R score was the highest among the
subjects, indicating a broad scope of self-perceived distress.
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Six months prior to our interview, Kathy's 43 year old father
was killed in a commercial plane crash. She reported, in simple
but harrowing detail, learmng about the crash and waiting for
information:
First, we heard on TV that there was a plane crash We
weren't even sure if he was really on that flight.' We had noclue, no one called or anything
. . .at first, we heard thatthere were survivors, then they told us there weren't any. Wedidn t know anything for a couple of days, until they had alist of passengers and they had his name on it. Five dayslater, they identified him by his dental records or somethinqA lot of waiting—that was the worst part, trying to hold onto hope—hope that he somehow got off the plane, or that hedidn't get a ticket.
Although the parents of several subjects died unejqjectedly,
Kathy was the only subject whose bereavement was due to such a
cataclysmic accident. 1° She spoke often of her sense of disbelief:
You never think something like this is going to happen to you.
It's always to the other person. You see it on TV, but it's
people that you'll never meet, never know. It's a shock when
something happens.
.
.It's one thing v^ien it's death by old age,
but it's hard to believe that so many things could happen,
that anything could happen tomorrow. I don't think you can
really control what's happening.
Unlike Sharon, Kathy's demeanor was taciturn and subdued. She
presented as being ^thick-skinned' and did not have an emotionally
expressive presentation. While very responsive to ray questions,
her stance in the interview was somevtot emotionally detached;
however, much of vdiat she said indicated a great sense of
One other subject ejqjerienced a bereavement that had a
dramatic precipitant. She lost both her mother and father, in
unrelated incidents, within three years of each other. Her mother
fell down a flight of stairs in the family's home and died the next
day of ccmplications related to the fall. Her father died suddenly
of a hecirt attack. She too, scored extremely low on the Meaning
scale of the WAS.
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confusion, and even bewilderment, about how to nake sense of
things.
Kathy appeared to have lost some of her identity in her
father's death. She spoke of the close relationship they had, and
how important it was for her to please him:
One of the best feelings was v*ien I knew he was proud of
me.
.
.1 feel like I have to make him proud of me, even now.It's stronger now than before he died.
However, this sense of identification with him was both
motivating and a source of confusion:
He was an accountant, I'm thinking of becoming an
accountant.
.
.I'm always wondering if what I'm doing, and vtot
I'm going to do in my future, is for me or for him. Ri<^t
after he died, one of the first things I said was "I'm going
to live for him." I don't know if that's v*iat I'm doing or
not. Sometimes I'm not sure v*io I'm doing things for me or
him.
Kathy was also confused about v^iether she was mourning
"properly" or not, and talked about her grief process with
defensive qualifications:
I feel guilty about not going to temple everyday, but I've
talked to friends v*io have said ^You're mourning in your own
way,
'
and even thou^ sometimes now I feel guilty about going
out and having a good time, I am mourning, and no one can tell
me I'm not.
And in terms of how to make sense of the world, Kathy's
beliefs had undergone tremendous upheaval. Kathy's beliefs in fate
and chance, her realization that "so many things could happen" were
new: "I never thought about it before because it wasn't there to
think about." The fact that something did happen, that it was her
family and not scaneone on TV, shattered Kathy's beliefs in safety,
invulnerability, and meaning.
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interestingly, though, part of Kathy's confusion was that, in
fact, she had not abandoned these beliefs to the degr^ that she
thought made cognitive sense:
^t^^ii^^""^ ^^^^ ^ happen to me, butI s not as strong; I don't know why I still have it at
: -iH^ "^^^^ changed my beliefs. You miqhtthir^ right after it happens "I don't believe anymor^; " brfthink If yc^ believed something all along, it's not giing toall of a sudden change what you believed.
For Kathy, the confusion was how to continue holding beliefs ~
such as a belief in justice, that pecple get what they deserve -
that she had learned weren't necessarily true. Cognitively, she
saw the belief as sham, yet she was acknowledging that on some
deeper level she needed to be able to retuni to it. Ihe struggle
for her was v^ether she could allow herself to return to the old
beliefs, which had been proven invalid, but which nonetheless
continued to provide necessary, if illusory, guidelines for how to
ascribe meaning to the world.
In her non-elaborative style, Kathy summed up her willingness
to maintain the paradoxes that she now believed in, such as
maintaining beliefs that she knew not to be true and consciously
choosing to believe in an afterlife because she found comfort in
it:
People have lots of different ways of coping. There's no
ri<^t way. If the way you cope doesn't hurt you...well, you
have to get on with your life.
It is as if Kathy, v^iose most fundamental assunptions about
life had been disrupted by a dramatic, random event, was engaged in
a process of damage-control. She was attenpting to salvage v*iat
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she cxxad free her faulty, t..t nuch needed, world view, so that she
mi^t continue to believe in something.
Cc«npared with Jane and Michael, the assumptive worlds of
Sharon and Kathy had been seriously assaulted by the trauma of
their parents' death. In fact, the word trauma, as it is commonly
used, did not seem applicable to the event of the death for Michael
and Jane, but it did for Kathy and Sharon, in Sharon's case, the
iitpact of the event may be understood by several factors: the
relative une^q^ectedness of the event, a conflicted and unresolved
relationship with her father, and an emotionally-charged style of
dealing with the world. For Kathy, the cataclysmic, fatal accident
was an event of such magnitude that it boldly robbed her of the
belief that bad things don't happen.
Both were struggling, without success, to maintain old
beliefs. Each needed to find new ways to make sense of the world.
For Kathy, this mi^t mean reconciling the discrepancy between her
need to believe in a sense of personal invulnerability and the fact
that such a belief may be functional, but false. For Sharon, the
issue is how to loosen the grip of her old beliefs, or how to
resolve the tension of wishing to return to an old belief system-
one in v^iich things made sense and she felt secure and loved—that
in fact she never fully had. Sharon did not want to return to the
ways things were; she wanted to return to the way she wished things
were. Until she can address the difference between these two, she
will be cau^t with nothing substantial to believe in.
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Ihese case studies begin to partially illustrate v^t a fuller
analysis of the interview data reveals: in an individual suffering
from a trauma, it is not inherently good or bad, healthy or
pathological, to maintain or discard an extant belief system. At
least one additional cofactor is also relevant: v^ether the old
assumptive beliefs are being maintained defensively, in a
dysfunctional way; or, conversely, whether new beliefs represent a
inodified framework for understanding the world, or the lack of a
framework.
In other words, to approach the same issue from another angle,
respondents can be divided into four categories: 1) individuals
v^o, after the trauma, maintained their old beliefs in a way vMch
was iiipeding psychological health; 2) individuals v^o maintained
their old beliefs in a way v^ich facilitated psychological health;
3) individuals vAiose beliefs had been changed, but \Aio found
themselves lost and bereft of a necessary schema with which to
function; and 4) individuals for v*icm the bereavement changed their
beliefs, but v*io had adapted well and found meaning in new ones.H
Concepts such as "psychological health" are, of course,
complex and multi-faceted. Additionally, this cursory
categorization belies some difficult questions: When is denial a
valuable tool for survival or, conversely, an iirpediment to growth
and a defensive distortion of reality? What is, in fact, an
"appropriate" response to grief or trauma: to be symptomatic or
asynptomatic, to have your beliefs radicalized or to have them
remain static? These valuable questions are beyond the scope of
this work. However, if one were to use the SCL-90 as a rudimentary
measure of psychological distress, the quatemate categorization
discussed above is valid with this sarople of subjects. SCL-90
scores did not significantly correlate with the belief measures of
the WAS, indicating that beliefs in randomness, justice and control
were independent of self-perceived psychological distress.
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Among this saitple of bereaved individuals, there were subjects in
each of these categories.
The interviews suggest that at least four potential factors
may be involved in dictating what kind of iinpact a close death will
have on an individual's assumptive world: the degree of perceived
loss, the manner of the death, the degree to which the relationship
with the parent was ambivalent, and per^nality-r^lated factors
such as ego-strength, emotional lability, and coping style.
Additionally, factors such as social support and modified external
realities (such as sudden financial changes, or new role
responsibilities within a family)
, while less relevant to the
present study, will likely also affect assumptive changes, ihe
above factors will interact in such a way that may be seen as
additive (or multiplicative) ; thus, for example, Michael's robust
sense of self-control may not have survived intact if his father
had not had a long history of illness, or Kathy's high level of
self-reported psychological distress might not have been so extreme
had the death been less dramatically sudden. Whether, and how,
beliefs change is not a simple question, and likely involves a
conplex relationship between intrapsychic factors, the degree of
the assault, and the actual facts and context of a person's life.
In summary, this chapter looked at the assunptive worlds of
four bereaved individuals, and the ways in v*iich their experiences
affected how they ascribed meaning to the world. For two of the
individuals, their bereavement caused only minor disruption to
their beliefs; in contrast, the assunptive worlds of the other two
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were greatly shaken. While they do not fit in with traditional
stage models of grief, the cases of Michael and Jane my be
exerplative of one of the grievii^ cat^ories prx^ by Worbran
and Silver (in press)
: individuals v*io r^ct to loss with little
immediate or subsequent distress. Sharon and Kathy, on the other
hand, are suffering from the loss of their basic assumptions-their
reality formation-as well as their loss in reality. For them, the
tasks of bereavement are different, and involve regainiiig, or
reforming, a network of beliefs by vfeLch they can make sense of the
world.
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CHAPTER XII
ANALYSIS OF QUAUTATIVE DATA III:
SOyiE CX3NCIUDING CX3MMENTS
At the outset of the study, a possible concern was that it
would be difficult to find subjects vAio met the simple, but
demanding, criteria of having recently lost a parent and felt
willing to talk about it. This proved not to be difficult at all.
Althou<^ they were not all included in the analyses, for reasons
previously e^qslained, 27 subjects were interviewed, and a few
others volunteered but were deemed inappropriate for various
reasons. Why did so many people choose to participate?
When this question was asked in the interview, several answers
emerged repeatedly. People felt that they had learned something
from their ej^jerience and wanted to share it with others. It was a
way to give back some of v^t they felt they had received. Some
subjects thou^t that finding other subjects would be difficult,
and so they volunteered because they knew they fit the bill. Some
stated sijiply that they wanted the opportunity to re-examine their
own grieving process, to see where they were compared to the last
time they had seriously considered it. Several subjects pointed
out that they welcomed, but were rarely afforded, opportunities to
talk about their loss, given that the omnipresent social support
immediately following the death dwindled dramatically in the
following months and years.
There were, I believe, at least two additional forces at work.
First, everyone viho participated was, in his or her own way, an
ejqjert on grief. More often than not, there is nothing in a
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person's prior history that has pr^par^i him or her for the
intensity, nature, and duration of the emotions that acconpany
bereavement. Society at large provides no guidance; images of
death or mourning in the media minimize the traumatic potential of
the event, and the culture perpetuates the notion that death and
dying are taboo subjects. To go thrxxigh the experience of
bereavement is a hi^y personal education. Despite the important
facilitative effect of social support, it r^ins a solitary
journey to accept vtot must be accepted, to work through viiat must
be worked through. There is a sense of pride and of accomplishment
that accompany coping well or having successfully mastered a
traumatic event, and subjects wished to display, and share, the
ejq^ertise they had gained, in the only way by which it may be
gained.
Related to this, however, is the fact that grief is isolating.
It is not without trepidation that individuals embark on the path
of grief by themselves, with no one to tell them if they are doing
it correctly. This unspoken subtext—am I grieving correctly?--
emerged repeatedly as a concern of many subjects, and was, I
believe, one of the reasons they chose to participate. Subjects
who were coping well, subjects who apparently were not—regarxiless,
there was a continual wondering if they wer^ handling their
mourning correctly, if they were all right, if they were acting
appropriately. Several subjects spoke of their coping strategies,
or of their behaviors since the death, in defensive terms: "I am
mourning, and no one can tell me I'm not mourning. . .1 think people
believe in vtotever they want to believe in." For many subjects,
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the iirtervia, «as a r^ity test, to ctetermine if «hat they had
been workir^ on in isolation with the approval of a researcher
in the field.
Ihe data frc«n this study si^port Wortman and Silver's (1987;
in press) cx^ntention that grief is a nailti-faoeted phenomenon v^ich
does not lend itself easily to a single, monolithic theoretical
understanding, m terms of the duration of grief, it seems that
several of the individuals completed the bulk of their grievii^
process within a few months after the loss. Hence, the suggestion
that grief is of a fixed duration, and optimally a phenomenon
lasting one to two years, was not substantiated by this population.
And in terms of the emotional reactions to loss, not all the
bereaved subjects expressed anger, and not all even expressed
sadness. As such, the notion of "appropriate" grief consisting of
a prescribed emotional path was also not substantiated.
Conducting 27 interviews with bereaved individuals was a
humbling experience. I was continually impressed by the resilience
and wisdom of the subjects, the honesty with VyMch many had
addressed their loss, the tremendously renewed sense of meaning
some had been able to bring to their lives, and the ability of most
to face adversity and emerge, if not unscathed, in much stronger
shape than they themselves might have predicted.
Averill and Nunley (1988) argue that grief has increasingly
come to be seen as a psychological phenomenon requiring the
involvement of the mental health profession. Certainly, bereaved
individuals might seek out, and benefit from, psychotherapeutic
intervention for numerous reasons. However, the present study
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suggests that many bereaved irxiivicbals a.^ capable of addressii^
the difficulties of loss in the context of their own lives,
erployi^ useful and creative expiry roechanisir^ to mintain their
ability to function in a changed world.
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CHAPIER XIII
oo^cmsiQN
in their introduction to a r«^t collection of papers on
bereavement, Stroebe, stroebe i Kansson (1988) b^in: upev, people
escape the tragedy of losing a loved f«r^n someti^ duri:^ their
lives, and «hen it haR^ the world changes" (p.i) . ihe present
study «as an attetpt to learn hew, fr™ a specific vantage point,
the world does indeed change.
The prinicipal theoretical assumption underlying this study
was that bereavement, like other potential traumas, disrupts some
of the most basic and profound assumptions by which individuals
structure their world and self views. It was hypothesized that the
beliefs most susceptible to disruption would be those related to
how individuals ascribe meanir^ to their lives. Would individuals
vdio had been bereaved be able to maintain their beliefs that life
was just and controllable, that events did not happen randomly or
by chance, that if they were decent people, misfortune would avert
them?
The data from the present study indicate that, in fact, these
beliefs can be greatly disn?)ted by bereavement. The bereaved
individuals in this study were less able to ascribe meaning to the
world than their non-bereaved peers, and were more likely to
attribute events to chance rather than to principles of justice or
control. The bereaved individuals had not only lost a parent; they
were also bereft of the beliefs by which they had previously made
sense of the world.
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or
was
s
or
Miile as a group the bereavoi individuals wer^ less able to
maintain their beliefs in ir^ani^, not all the subjects lost
abandoned these beliefs. Ihe finding that the loss of r^eanii^
strongly associated with the degree of grief has important
ramifications for our growing understandii^ of grief
. individual
v^o were grieving less were those v^o were able to maintain,
redefine (but not abandon) their beliefs about how the world works.
The ability to make some sense of the loss - to answer the
question ••Why?" - was fundamentally important in coping. By
bringing some sense or meaning to the death, these individuals were
able to maintain the conceptual framework which guided their
approach to life, in contrast, individuals vdio could not make
sense of the loss, v^o asked themselves ••Why?" but found no answer,
were struggling not only with the actual loss, but also with the
need to discover anew fundamental principles by v^ch they might
live.
In addition to facilitating our understanding of grief, the
present study also sheds some light on how change is brou^t about
in an individual's assumptive world. Because of a complex
interaction of intrapsychic, interpersonal and external factors,
the bereavement had profound effects on seme individuals, and
relatively insignificant effects on others. For some individuals,
their beliefs were shattered. For others, it seemed that
maintaining their beliefs, i.e. not allowing them to be shattered,
was of such importance that their understanding of the death was
cast vAiolly within the context of their pre-existing conceptual
system. And for still other individuals, it appeared that they
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caught in a p««ess of
.^otiation betaken beliefs ancj
old, salvaging vtot they oculd fran their pre^isting belief
systen. a^ stret*ing the, to fit the cto^ed reality which they
now faced.
By focusing priinarily on a certain aspect of the experience of
bereavement
- how the e^ienc^ affects the fundamental beliefs
v^ich guide an individual's life - this study necessarily ignored
many other relevant areas of concern. Additionally, liMtations of
the present study suggest that caution may be warranted in too
broad an application of the firxiii^s. For example, the population
studied, narrowly defined in terms of age and type of loss, may not
be indicative of other, older populations, with the exception of
two individuals, all the subjects could be considered as
adolescents at the time of their loss, it may be that there is
something particular to that age group in terms of coping with
trauma.
Further, because of the relative homogeneity of the population
in terms of the type of loss (i.e., the majority of the deaths were
due to illness, either cancer or cardiac disease) , this study
cannot address the important differences between sudden vs.
expected death. In terms of an assault on fundamental assumptions,
it is reasonable to assume that a sudden, unejqjected death would
potentially have a greater impact on an individual's beliefs than
one that is anticipated.
Ihe sample population for the present study was more
specifically defined and more rigorously selected than is usual in
studies of bereavement. Selection of the bereaved population was
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detennined by the recency of the death
, the age of the subjects
,
the type of death, and the relationship of the deceased to the
subject, ^er, the use Of a carefully Hatched control group
distinguished this sUidy frc the vast najority of grief-related
resear^ projects (see W. Str^ & stroebe, 1987 for a fuller
discussion Of methodological problems in bereavement research)
.
Still, due to the constraints of the available population, a
few potentially signficant factors went uncontrolled in the present
study. These factors included the the gender of the bereaved
individual, the specifc cause of death, and v^ether the loss was
maternal or paterml. The literature on bereavement, although
ambiguous on each of these variables, nonetheless suggests that
they may be important in determining patterns of grief.
However, as already discussed, no gender-related differences
were found in the present study in terms of grieving response or
assumptive beliefs. Because of the nature of the study,
enphasizing the conceptual changes accompanying bereavement rather
than the grieving process itself, it appears that the sample was
adequately homogenous to test the hypotheses in question.
In terms of future research, the present study opens the doors
down several different pathways. First, do the altered beliefs in
meaning associated with bereavement hold any predictive value, in
terms of the course of the grieving process? At present, a follow-
up study is being undertaken with the 21 bereaved individuals who
participated in the current study, to determine the progression of
their grief over the past year and to reassess their beliefs in
meaning.
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second, is it possible to disentangle the oa,plex «eb of
factors that leads sc»e individuals to ^is^i^ their old beliefs
and forces others to relin^sh ttem? Given an increas«i
understandi^ of the ass»ptive v„rlds *i* guide people's lives,
this nay be possible i. a c^aalitative, clinically-orientad study
v^icl. examines both the intraf^yAio and interpersonal worlds of
bereaved indivduals.
And third, the present study found that an inability to
ascribe meaning to the death was strongly associated with a
pronounced grief reaction. Can this datum help construct a irore
flexible and accurate model for grief than the stage-type approach
v^ich currently predominates in both professional and public
thinking? in keeping with the work of Averill (1968; Averill &
Nunley, 1988), Parkes (e.g., 1988) and Wortman and Silver (1987, in
press)
,
the present study suggests that new directions and
conceptual paradigms are necessary to move forward in our
understanding of grief.
Examining the changes in the bereaved's assumptive worlds may
play a key role in attenpting to assess and understand the major
changes that follow the death of loved one. After such an
ejqjerience, one can no longer see the world as one saw it prior to
the loss. For theoreticians attempting to understanding
bereavement and for clinicians hoping to ameliorate the pain of the
bereaved, an awareness of the dramatic shifts in how a traumatized
person ascribes meaning to his or her life may help demystify the
complexity and difficulty of bereavement.
Ill
Bereave^snt, lite any tra»a, tests the liMts of one's
a-^tions, one's entea«^, or^'s ^iUence. By operatic at
that extr^, ^ ^ ^ ^^^^
ente^ in day to day life, the fx^si^iuty arises of leami:^ ^th
deeply t«inful and, occasio:«Uy, profc^y encouraging lessons.
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